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Abstract
This paper analyzes the decision of firms to sell assets to fund investments (financing asset sales). For a sample
of U.S. manufacturing firms during the 1971–2010 period, we document new stylized facts about financing asset
sales that cannot be explained by traditional motives for selling assets, such as financial distress or financing con-
straints. Using a structural model of financing, investment, and macroeconomic risk, we show that financing asset
sales attenuate the debt overhang problem, because asset sale financed investments imply lower wealth transfers
from equity to debt than otherwise identical but equity financed investments. This novel motive to reduce the debt
overhang problem can explain how financing asset sales relate to firm characteristics and business cycles. We also
confirm with simulated panels of model firms that are structurally similar to their empirical counterpart that they
indeed feature the dynamic patterns of financing asset sales we observe in the data for real firms.
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1. Introduction
A crucial component of corporate investment decisions is the choice of the source of funding. In practice,
asset sales play an important role for investment financing. For instance in 2011, the French cement gi-
ant Lafarge targeted EUR 750 million (USD 1.1 billion) of asset sales to refinance parts of its debt for the
2007 purchase of Egyptian Orascom Cement. In the same year, Thomson Reuter’s announced to raise about
USD 1 billion by selling two businesses to fund further investments. In fall 2012, Petrobras announced large
asset sales to contribute to the financing needs of nearly USD 15 billion to fund its five-year investment plan.
While debt and equity are widely studied sources of investment financing, asset sales are rarely considered.
This is surprising, given that the average proceeds from asset sales correspond to roughly 44% of the average
net amount of newly issued equity for U.S. manufacturing firms in Compustat between 1971 and 2010.
This paper analyzes the decision of firms to sell assets to fund investments (financing asset sales). We un-
cover a novel aspect of this decision. We show that this relation can explain stylized facts of empirically ob-
served asset sale patterns. Recognizing that investment may be financed with asset sales also has important
consequences for corporate investment policy and firm valuation, in particular, when business cycle shocks
influence investment and asset sale decisions of firms. We incorporate business cycles in our analysis for two
reasons. First, while the cyclicality of external financing is intensively studied in recent papers, the cyclical-
ity of financing asset sales is not discussed (e.g. Korajczyk and Levy 2003). Second, previous work finds that
business cyclicality is crucial to understand financing and investment decisions (e.g., Chen and Manso 2010).
We document empirical facts for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms that cannot jointly be explained
with traditional motivations for asset sales, such as distress or financial constraints (e.g., Bates 2005, Hov-
akimian and Titman 2006). As the incentive for asset sales is unobservable in our data, we focus on the corre-
lation between asset sales and investment. The idea behind this approach is that financing asset sales should
be reflected in the correlation between asset sales and investment. We explore firm and business cycle vari-
ables as determinants of financing asset sales. At the same time, the regression set-up allows us to control for
other firm and industry characteristics that are potentially correlated with asset sales. We find that the corre-
lation between asset sales and investment is significantly higher (i) for firms with higher leverage, (ii) in bad
business cycle states, and (iii) for firms with a low cyclicality of growth options in bad business cycle states.
Motivated by these stylized facts on financing asset sales, we derive the implications of a structural
model with intertemporal macroeconomic risk, embedded inside a representative agent consumption-based
asset pricing framework in the spirit of Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010) and Chen (2010). This model
environment allows us to derive endogenous investment, equity financing, and financing asset sale decisions
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over the business cycles by linking these decisions to asset prices and economic fundamentals. To generate
financing needs, model firms do not only consist of invested assets but, following Arnold, Wagner, and West-
ermann (2013), also have a growth option that is costly to exercise. We augment this model environment by
incorporating business cycle dependency of the equity issuance cost, the asset liquidity, and the growth op-
tion. Using the model, we establish the link between financing asset sales and the debt overhang (or wealth
transfer) problem between equityholders and debtholders (Myers 1977) by analyzing equityholders’ en-
dogenous choice between issuing new equity and selling assets to finance the exercise of the growth option.
Our analysis starts with a typical firm at time zero that consists of assets in place and a growth option and
that is optimally financed with equity and risky debt. When the firm exercises its growth option, the total as-
set volatility decreases, and total earnings increase. Hence, the exercise creates a wealth transfer from equity-
holders to debtholders because debt becomes less risky. Due to this agency problem, equityholders invest too
late compared to an investment policy that maximizes the value of the expansion option (underinvestment).
Equityholders can also select the optimal funding source for the exercise cost of the growth option.
Selling assets when exercising the growth option increases leverage, which makes debt more risky. The
increase in the riskiness of the firm’s debt associated with the asset sale causes a reverse wealth transfer
from debtholders to equityholders that mitigates underinvestment. Thus, asset sales can be relatively more
attractive than equity issuances for firms that are more exposed to underinvestment.
The wealth transfer problem is larger for more leveraged firms because debt is riskier and hence more
sensitive to earnings and asset volatility changes. As a consequence, equityholders of more leveraged firms
have a stronger incentive to use financing asset sales. This insight provides a compelling explanation to
our first stylized fact that the correlation between asset sales and investment is significantly higher for firms
with larger leverage. Moreover, our model allows us to examine the endogenous relation between business
cycles and financing asset sales. In bad business cycle states, leverage increases for a given level of earnings
because the decrease in the asset value of a firm is larger than the decrease in the debt value. At the same
time, however, equityholders optimally invest at a higher earnings level than in good business cycle states,
which induces a lower leverage at investment. Our results show that the first effect dominates i.e. leverage
at investment is higher in bad business cycle states. Since the wealth transfer problem at option exercise
is larger for higher levels of leverage, our model predicts that equityholders tend to prefer financing asset
sales during bad business cycle states. These results provide an explanation for the first two stylized facts.
Finally, the model also shows that the more valuable a firm’s growth option is in bad states, the lower is
the earnings level at which it optimally invests during bad states. A lower earnings threshold for investment
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entails a higher leverage at investment. So, conditional on investing in bad states, the wealth transfer prob-
lem is more pronounced for a higher leverage, which explains the third stylized fact of a higher correlation
between asset sales and investment for firms with less cyclical growth options.
To explore the dynamic features of our model, we simulate panels of model-implied firms that are struc-
turally similar to the Compustat sample. Each simulation generates a time series of investment, financing,
and default observations over the business cycles. We compare these simulated observations to the empiri-
cal patterns to validate the model. The model-implied dynamic patterns of financing asset sales provide an
explanation to the stylized facts on asset sales and investment that we document in the empirical analysis. In
particular, we find that, on average, 42% of the investment in the simulations are financed with asset sales.
The simulated samples reconcile the empirical regularity (i) that the correlation between asset sales and
investment rises with leverage. The number of firms that use financing asset sales conditional on investment
increases to roughly 64% for firms in the highest leverage tercile compared to 35% in the lowest tercile.
Investment and financing asset sales in the simulated samples are procyclical. The fraction of firms that use
financing asset sales to invest increases to 54% during bad states, and decreases to 38% during good states,
which reflects the empirical pattern (ii) that the correlation between asset sales and investment is higher in
bad business cycle states. Finally, we also obtain stylized fact (iii) in the simulated panels. The cyclicality
of the growth opportunity is important in that the fraction of firms that use financing asset sales to invest
during bad states is particularly large for firms that have a less cyclical growth option. In sum, the simulation
results show that our model, in which the wealth transfer problem drives the decision of firms to sell assets,
yields dynamic patterns of financing asset sales that explain the stylized facts in the Compustat data.
Our contribution is three-fold. First, we develop a dynamic model of investment and financing that
endogenizes the choice between equity and asset sales as funding source. The model yields a set of novel
insights and testable predictions that improve our understanding about asset sale motives of firms. More
specifically, we provide theoretical and empirical evidence for agency conflicts between debt and equity as
an important and heretofore neglected motive for asset sales. Our findings complement previous work that
associates asset sales with alternative motives. Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994), Brown, James,
and Mooradian (1994), and Weiss and Wruck (1998) analyze the role of financial distress for asset sales.
Investment funding needs of financially constrained firms as a motive for asset sales are discussed in Ho-
vakimian and Titman (2006), and Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010). Warusawitharana (2008) argues
that asset reallocations are mainly driven by firm-specific productivity shocks. More recently, Edmans and
Mann (2013) revisit the pecking order theory by examining the relative information asymmetry associated
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with issuing equity and selling assets. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995), and Bates (2005) focus on the trade-
off between investment efficiency and agency costs of managerial discretion associated with selling assets.
Morellec (2001) also considers agency conflicts between debt and equity in the context of asset sales. He
highlights that asset liquidity increases the debt capacity only when bond covenants restrict the disposition
of assets close to bankruptcy. In contrast, we model asset sales to finance investment and show that it is
optimal for equityholders to negotiate debt covenants that admit asset sales if their proceeds are used to
purchase new assets (e.g., Smith and Warner 1979, Bradley and Roberts 2004, Nini, Smith, and Sufi 2009).
Second, we contribute to the literature on role of cyclicality for capital structure and credit risk (see
e.g. Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec 2006). We show that incorporating the impact of business cycle shocks
is crucial to jointly explain the corporate investment and financing asset sale decisions. While the effect
of cyclicality on asset sales through the productivity channel is already explored (e.g. Maksimovic and
Phillips 2001, Yang 2008), the impact of cyclicality through the financing channel has so far been neglected.
A closely related paper that considers macroeconomic risk and the debt overhang problem is Chen and
Manso (2010). Their results emphasize the cyclical nature of growth opportunities, and the increase of debt
overhang in bad states. However, they do not consider the role of asset sales. Our findings on the cycli-
cal nature of financing asset sales also complement the empirical literature that suggests internal resources
are more important during worse economic times (e.g., Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy 2010, Lemmon and
Roberts 2010, Campello, Graham, and Harvey 2010, Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey 2011).
Third, this paper integrates to a growing literature in corporate finance that uses simulated panels based
on structural models to explain stylized facts in real firm data (see e.g. Gomes and Livdan 2004, Hennessy
and Whited 2007, Strebulaev 2007). As endogeneity problems are hard to resolve with an appropriate em-
pirical identification strategy, we use our structural model to rationalize and support the stylized patterns
about the relation between financing asset sales and investment that we observe in the real data.
The paper proceeds as follow. In Section 2, we establish empirical facts on the correlation between asset
sales and investment. Section 3 introduces a structural model that to explain these stylized facts. Section 4
presents the model solution, and Section 5 derives the predictions generated by our model for a typical firm
at initiation. Finally, we simulate model-implied economies of firms to analyze the aggregate dynamics of
financing asset sales in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
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2. Stylized Facts
In this section, we document empirical patterns of financing asset sales for a sample of 3,022 U.S. manu-
facturing firms over the 1971–2010 period.1 The data on asset sales (Compustat item SPPE) does not reveal
the motive behind the asset sales. We can also not exploit a (quasi-) natural experiment or a discontinuity.
Hence, we try to identify firm characteristics and business cycle related factors that increase the correlation
between asset sales and investment. The idea behind this approach is that more financing asset sales should
result in an increased correlation between contemporaneous investment and asset sale. Moreover, focusing
on this correlation allows us to abstract away from fire sales of financially distressed firms. The reason
is that it is unlikely that distressed firms tend to invest heavily in those periods, in which they are forced
to sell assets to repay their debt. We document that the correlation between asset sales and investment is
higher (i) for firms with higher leverage, (ii) in bad business cycle states, and (iii) for firms with less cyclical
growth opportunities in bad business cycle states. Thus, we show that business cycle conditions, corporate
investment, and time-variation of growth opportunities are key determinants of financing asset sales.
Table 1 reports results for OLS panel regressions that explore the correlation of asset sales with invest-
ment, leverage, the cyclicality of a firm’s growth opportunities, financial constraints and other controls for
various firm characteristics. We include industry fixed effects. The standard errors are autocorrelation robust
and clustered at the industry level, and the R2s are adjusted for the number of variables in the regression.2
INSERT TABLE 1 NEAR HERE
Column (I) investigates the relation of asset sales and investment controlling for Tobin’s q, financial flex-
ibility (cash flow and financial slack), coverage ratio, leverage, and asset volatility. The estimation shows
that asset sale and investment are reliably positively correlated. Cash flow, asset volatility, and q exhibit
a negative significant regression coefficient, while financial slack and coverage ratio are not significantly
correlated with asset sale. The positive significant association between asset sale and investment suggests
that financing asset sales are a potential source of investment funding. However, we cannot interpret this
correlation by itself as an indicator of what may be a potential motive for firms to use financing asset sales.
To explore this question, we first investigate factors known to be related to the wealth transfer problem.
For instance, the wealth transfer problem increases with leverage (see e.g. Myers 1977). Hence, in column
(II), we explore the impact of leverage on the relationship between asset sale and investment by using an
1 All variable definitions, data cleaning filters and summary statistics for the Compustat sample are provided in Appendix B.
2 The quality of our results remains unaffected if we use e.g. two-step GMM estimations or two-way clustering at the year and at
the industry level or alternatively at the year and at the firm level.
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interaction term of investment and leverage. If higher leverage is a motive for financing asset sales, we
expect a positive coefficient for this interaction term. The result in column (II) confirms that the correlation
between asset sale and investment increases with leverage. Moreover, investment and leverage coefficients
become insignificant when we add the interaction term between investment and leverage.3
Chen and Manso (2010) show that the wealth transfer problem is more severe in bad states of the busi-
ness cycle. Hence, we are interested in how the correlation between asset sale and investment is related to
macroeconomic conditions. In column (III) of Table 1, we additionally incorporate the interaction between
investment and a dummy that is equal to one in a bad business cycle state.4 The positive significant coef-
ficient on this interaction term shows that the correlation between investment and asset sales is higher in
downturns. This finding emphasizes the importance of recognizing business cycle dynamics when explain-
ing the positive correlation of investment and asset sale.
Moreover, we next link financing asset sales to the cyclicality of growth opportunities. In particular,
we investigate whether firms, that have relatively valuable growth opportunities in economic downturns, ex-
hibit an increased correlation between asset sales and investments during bad states. To this end, we add in
column (IV) an interaction term that is the product of three variables: investment, a dummy that is equal to
one if the sample economy is in a bad state and zero otherwise, and the correlation between a firm’s growth
opportunity and the aggregate business cycle state. To construct the correlation measure, we estimate 5-
year rolling window correlations between the firm individual q and the aggregate sales growth in our entire
sample.5 The intuition for this correlation measure is that firms that exhibit a relatively lower value of this
measure tend to have relatively more valuable growth opportunities in bad states of the business cycle; on
the other hand higher values of the measure indicate that a firm has more cyclical growth opportunities.6
We find a negative coefficient for the interaction term between investment, business cycle states and the
cyclicality of a firm’s growth opportunity, implying that in bad states of the business cycle, firms with a
relatively lower cyclicality exhibit a stronger relationship between investments and asset sales.7
3 In unreported regressions, we replace the dependent variable by net equity issuance. We find that the coefficient estimate of the
interaction term of investment and leverage is negative and not significant.
4 For a bad business cycle year, the aggregate sales growth and the average annual equity return across sample firms are both
in the bottom 25% of all years. We choose this definition of a downturn because sales growth combined with market based
downturn measures are a direct measure of the propagation of positive and negative shocks from the aggregate economy onto
the corporate level (see also the downturn definitions in e.g. Opler and Titman 1994, Gilson, John, and Lang 1990).
5 We scale the firm individual q by the SIC3-industry average q to control for industry effects. Using larger windows for the
correlation measure within a reasonable range (e.g., seven years) has no qualitative effect on the results.
6 The 25% quantile of the correlation distribution for all firms is -0.5, the median is 0.02, and the 75% quantile is 0.56.
7 In unreported results, we additionally incorporate the interaction between the bad state dummy and leverage, and the triple
interaction between the bad state dummy, leverage, and investment. The coefficient on this triple interaction is positive and
significant, indicating that particularly high leverage firms have a stronger relationship between investments and asset sales
during bad states of the business cycle, which provides additional support to the wealth transfer problem as an important driver
of the positive relation between asset sales and investments.
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The above results indicate along several dimensions that the correlation between asset sales and invest-
ment increases with firm characteristics that are directly linked to an increased wealth transfer problem. An
alternative explanation could be that the positive relationship of leverage with the correlation between asset
sales and investments is driven by external financing constraints (e.g. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz 1995, Ho-
vakimian and Titman 2006, Bates 2005). To analyze the potential role of financing constraints for asset
sales, we add in column (V) the SA-index as a proxy for the financial constraint of firms.8 Higher values
of this index indicate lower financial constraints of a firm. The coefficient for the SA-index is positive and
significant, implying that unconstrained firms sell more assets.
This result does not answer the question whether financing constraints affect financing asset sales. Ad-
ditionally, it is well-known that less financially constrained firms have a higher debt capacity, i.e., they
can lever up their firm more easily (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore 1997, Almeida and Campello 2007, Hahn and
Lee 2012, Hart and Moore 1994). Hence, our primary result that high leverage firms conduct more financing
asset sales may be, in fact, driven by financing constraints. To address this concern, we incorporate the inter-
action of the SA-index with investment as an additional independent variable in column (VI). The interaction
term is insignificant, and the interaction of leverage with investment is only marginally affected by the new
controls compared to column (II). The result suggests that leverage (i.e., the wealth transfer problem instead
of financing constraints) is the driving force behind the correlation between asset sales and investment.
An alternative motive for asset sales besides investment financing needs is financial distress (e.g. Shleifer
and Vishny 1992, Weiss and Wruck 1998, Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz 1995). We test in the final regression
models whether financial distress has an impact on the correlation between asset sales and capital expendi-
tures. We do so by including in column (VII) an interaction term of investment and a dummy that indicates
if the firm individual Altman (1968) Z-score is below a value of three. Values below three indicate that a
firm is likely to be financially distressed. If financial distress were a driver of the asset sale and investment
correlation, we would expect a positive significant coefficient for the interaction term. However, the table
reveals an insignificant coefficient estimate. Thus, our finding on the correlation between asset sales and
investment is unlikely to be caused by financial distress.
Finally, the results for the interaction between investment and leverage could also be driven by financial
distress. To address this concern, we include a new interaction term of investment, leverage, and the Z-score
dummy in column (VIII). If financial distress were to matter for the coefficient on the interaction between
8 According to Hadlock and Pierce (2010), the SA-index is useful to measure the financial constraint. Related work supports
the view that the ingredients of this index, i.e. size and age, capture the financial constraint of a firm (see e.g. Hennessy and
Whited 2007, Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce 2009). Furthermore, size and age are also often interpreted as information asymmetry
measures (see e.g. Leary and Roberts 2010).
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investment and leverage, we would expect a positive coefficient on this new interaction term. However, the
coefficient is insignificant, and the interaction between investment and leverage by itself is hardly affected
(compared to column II) by the inclusion of the new interaction term. This finding establishes that fire sales
are not the driver of the positive impact of leverage on the correlation between investment and asset sales.
We conduct several robustness tests. For instance, our results are not driven by small observations of
asset sales or investments. The coefficients and t-statistics hardly change when we drop the smallest 10%
or 20% of the absolute values of asset sales and capital expenditures from our sample. Moreover, if we
focus on larger property, plant, and equipment values, our results become much stronger. For example, for
observations with property, plant, and equipment above its median value, the coefficient for the interaction
term of leverage and investment is 0.103 (t-statistic of 4.34), the coefficient for the interaction term of bad
state and investment is 0.031 (t-statistic of 2.26), and the coefficient for the triple interaction of investment,
bad state, and correlation is -0.039 (t-statistic of -3.32). At the same time, the coefficients for the interac-
tion of investment and the SA-index, and for the interaction of investment and the Z-score dummy remain
insignificant. These findings reinforce the robustness of the above stylized facts in that firms with plenty of
property, plant, and equipment may have better access to the asset sale market.
To summarize, our novel stylized facts for the correlation between investments and asset sales cannot be
explained by traditional motives for asset sales, such as financial constraints or financial distress. Leverage,
rather than proxies for financial constraints or financial distress, drives the results. Hence, the wealth transfer
problem between debt and equity is a potentially important driver of financing asset sales.
3. Model setup
In this section, we study a structural model with time-varying macroeconomic conditions, embedded inside
a representative agent consumption-based asset pricing framework in the spirit of Bhamra, Kuehn, and Stre-
bulaev (2010) and Chen (2010). This framework determines how aggregate risk and risk prices change with
the business cycle. It links the fluctuations in the first and second moments of aggregate growth rates to the
values of corporate securities. The model is well suited to explore the role of financing asset sales over the
business cycles, as it allows us to endogenize the effect of cyclicality in a simple and realistic fashion. More-
over, it shows how the values of equity, debt, and growth options that determine firms’ external financing
decisions are endogenously affected by time-varying business cycle conditions.
Following Arnold, Wagner, and Westermann (2013), each firm has one growth option that is costly to
exercise. The key innovation in our paper is that we allow firms to endogenously choose between financing
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the investment cost with the proceeds from the asset sales or the issuance of new equity. Moreover, we in-
corporate business cycle dependent equity issuance cost, asset liquidity, and cyclicality of the growth option.
The structural model approach allows us to analyze equityholders’ endogenous choice between issuing new
equity and selling assets to finance the exercise of the growth option in an economy with external financing
frictions. In addition, it easily lends itself to analyzing firm behavior in simulated panels to explore the
dynamic predictions of our model.
A potential caveat for financing asset sales is the existence of covenants in credit contracts that could
restrict both investment and asset sales as a source of internal financing. The covenant literature suggests,
however, that covenants observed for real firms provide substantial flexibility for expansion investments,
and with respect to the choice between new equity or asset sales as source of investment financing.9
3.1. Firm Earnings, Investment Financing and Time-Varying Business Cycle Conditions
The economy consists of N different firms with assets in place and a growth option, a large number of
identical infinitely lived households, and a government serving as a tax authority. There are two different
aggregate states, namely, good (G) and bad (B) states. Aggregate output, corporate earnings, and external
financing frictions depend on the current state. To model time-varying aggregate conditions, we define a
time-homogeneous observable Markov chain It≥0 with state space {G,B} and generator Q :=
[−λG λG
λB −λB
]
, in
which λi ∈ (0,1) is the rate of leaving state i.
The aggregate output Ct follows a regime-switching geometric Brownian motion
dCt
Ct
= θidt+σCi dW
C
t , i = G,B, (1)
in which WCt is a Brownian motion independent of the Markov chain. The parameters θi and σCi are the
growth rates and volatilities of the aggregate output, respectively. To incorporate the impact of time-varying
aggregate conditions, they are both regime-dependent. In equilibrium, aggregate consumption equals ag-
gregate output. The representative agent has the continuous-time analog of Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences of
stochastic differential utility type (e.g. Duffie and Epstein 1992a, Duffie and Epstein 1992b). The dynamics
9 Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) provide evidence of a widespread use of covenants that restrict investment in private credit
agreements. Their results, however, suggest that capital expenditure covenants address asset substitution and fire sales rather
than investment opportunities. In particular, the authors find that capital expenditure restrictions are less likely in credit
agreements of firms with more favorable investment opportunities. They also show that banks and borrowers tend to leave the
investment policy unrestricted when credit quality is high, or as long as covenants are not violated. Chava, Kumar, and Warga
(2010) show that bond covenants that restrict stock issuance are relatively rare compared to covenants that restrict the issuance
of debt. While covenants on asset sales are frequently used, they often explicitly allow firms to sell assets in the ordinary course
of business, or as long as the proceeds from the asset sale are used to purchase new fixed assets (Smith and Warner 1979).
Other common provisions in asset covenants of private debt contracts are restrictions on asset sales above a fixed amount or
requirements to pay down debt with the proceeds from asset sales (Bradley and Roberts 2004).
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of the stochastic discount factor, the risk-free rates, ri, the market prices of consumption risk, ηi, and the
market prices of jump risk, κi, are derived in Appendix A.1.
At any time, the earnings process of a firm follows
dXt
Xt
= µidt+σX ,Ci dW
C
t +σ
X ,iddW Xt , i = G,B, (2)
in which W Xt is a standard Brownian motion describing an idiosyncratic shock, independent of the aggregate
output shock WCt and the Markov chain. µi are the regime-dependent drifts; σ
X ,C
i > 0, the firm-specific
regime-dependent volatilities associated with the aggregate output process; and σX ,id > 0, the firm-specific
volatility associated with the idiosyncratic Brownian shock.
Denote the risk-neutral measure by Q. The expected growth rates, µ˜i, of a firm’s earnings under the
risk-neutral measure are given by
µ˜i := µi−σX ,Ci ηi, (3)
and the risk-neutral transition intensities, λ˜i, by
λ˜i = eκiλi. (4)
Intuitively, in bad times when marginal utility is higher, bad news about future earnings are worse.
Hence, by incorporating jump-risk into the expression in Equation (4), we link the historical probabilities of
a change in the regime with the risk-neutral probabilities. The main effect for the security prices is that, under
the risk neutral measure, bad states last longer and the economy switches faster from a good to a bad state.
Corporate taxes need to be paid at a constant rate τ , and full offsets of corporate losses are allowed.
Following Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006), Chen (2010), and Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010),
the unleveraged after-tax asset value of a firm can then be written as
Vt = (1− τ)Xtyi, i = G,B, (5)
with yi being the price-earnings ratio in state i determined by
y−1i = ri− µ˜i+
(ri− µ˜ j)− (ri− µ˜i)
r j− µ˜ j + p˜ p˜ f˜ j. (6)
p˜ := λ˜i + λ˜ j is the risk-neutral rate of news arrival, and
(
f˜G, f˜B
)
=
(
λ˜B
p˜ ,
λ˜G
p˜
)
is the long-run risk-neutral
distribution. y−1 can be interpreted as a discount rate, in which the first two terms constitute the standard
expression if the economy stayed in regime i forever, and the last term accounts for future time spent in
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regime j. As in Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010), the price-earnings ratio in the main analysis is
higher in good states than in bad states i.e. yG > yB.
Finally, the volatility of the earnings process in regime i can be expressed as
σ¯i =
√(
σX ,Ci
)2
+
(
σX ,id
)2
. (7)
A firm’s expansion (growth) option is modeled as an American call option on its earnings. In particular,
a firm (i) can irreversibly exercise this option at any time t¯, (ii) needs to pay the exercise cost Ki¯, and (iii)
achieves additional future earnings of si¯Xt for all t ≥ t¯ for some factor si¯ > 0, in which i¯ is the realized state
of the economy at the time of exercise. In contrast to Arnold, Wagner, and Westermann (2013), both the
exercise cost Ki¯ and the factor si¯ are regime-dependent to model firms with varying degrees of the cyclical-
ity of their growth option. If an expansion option is exercised, it is once and for all converted into assets in
place, so the firm consists of only invested assets.
The exercise cost Ki¯ can be financed by either issuing new equity or by selling assets in place.
10 Both
sources of financing impose frictions on the firm. First, we explicitly consider external financing frictions
i.e. that new equity financing is costly, as suggested by the literature (e.g. Campello and Hackbarth 2012).
In particular, each equity-financed $1 leads to a regime-dependent issue cost of ϒi¯. The regime dependency
of ϒi allows us to capture the notion that external equity financing is more restricted during bad states (e.g.
Erel, Julio, Kim, and Weisbach 2011). The cost ϒi can be interpreted as the linear component of the equity
issuance cost. Hence, a firm with access to equity financing in a given regime can finance the exercise cost
Ki¯ by issuing new equity of Ki¯(1+ϒi¯).
Second, Pulvino (1998) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) argue that selling assets is costly. The
cost occurs because assets are partially firm-specific and the firm-specific component is irreversibly lost
in asset transfers, or because existing assets are not made-to-order and, therefore, may require additional
disassembling costs to tailor the assets to the buyer’s specific needs. We incorporate this friction by stating
that the proceeds from selling assets on the market correspond to 0 ≤ Λi ≤ 1 times the value of the assets
to the firm. Consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1992), the parameter Λi can be interpreted as the regime-
dependent liquidity of the firm’s assets in place, and is calibrated such that ΛG > ΛB. After exercising the
expansion option, the firm obtains current earnings of (si¯ + 1)Xt i.e. si¯Xt from the expansion option, and
10 We neglect internal cash or additional debt upon investment as financing sources. Both elements would introduce an additional
layer of incentive problems that are beyond the scope of this paper. For example, with new debt issuance upon investment,
equityholders overlever and overinvest, because they can transfer wealth from initial debt to themselves, which would drive
the results. As it is initially not known whether the growth option will be exercised in a good or in a bad state, the incentive
problems cannot simply be solved with a priority structure as suggested in Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) for a one regime model.
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Xt from existing assets in place. The value of the existing assets in place at option exercise corresponds to
(1− τ)Xt¯yi¯. The value of the assets required to be sold to finance the exercise cost of the expansion option
is given by Ki¯/Λi¯ or by
Ki¯/Λi¯
(1−τ)Xt¯ yi¯ as a fraction of current earnings. As a result, total earnings of a firm at any
point in time after financing the exercise cost by selling assets correspond to(
si¯+1−
Ki¯/Λi¯
(1− τ)Xt¯yi¯
)
Xt . (8)
Firms take on (risky) debt because it allows them to shield part of the corporate income from taxation.
The debt maturity is assumed to be infinite. Once debt has been issued, a firm pays a coupon c at each
moment in time. Shareholders have the option to default on their debt obligations. Default is triggered when
shareholders are no longer willing to inject additional equity capital to meet net debt service requirements
(e.g. Leland 1998). If default occurs, the firm is immediately liquidated. Debtholders receive the liquida-
tion value of the total unleveraged asset value i.e. of the unleveraged assets in place plus the unleveraged
growth option, less bankruptcy costs. The proceeds from liquidating the firm upon default correspond to Λi
times the total unleveraged asset value. The bankruptcy costs include, for example, lawyers’ and accoun-
tants’ fees, or the value of the managerial time spent in administering the bankruptcy. They correspond to
a fraction 1−αi of the proceeds from liquidation, with αi ∈ (0,1]. Hence, the recovery rates to debtholders
correspond to Λiαi times the unleveraged asset value upon default. The assumption that debtholders also
recover a fraction of the unleveraged expansion option implies that the option is transferrable. Upon default,
however, the expansion opportunities are far out-of-the-money and have, consequently, only limited value.
Hence, assumptions concerning their transferability or recovery rates have a negligible impact on our results.
Equityholders face the following decisions. First, once debt has been issued, they select the default,
expansion, and investment financing policies that maximize the equity value. Second, they determine the
initially optimal capital structure by choosing a coupon that maximizes the firm value. We do not incorporate
debt restructuring neither when the option is exercised nor at endogenous restructuring points.
4. Model solution
Firms can finance investments by selling assets or by issuing equity in each regime, which leaves us with
four different funding strategies: financing by issuing equity in good states and selling assets in bad states,
financing by issuing equity in both good states and bad states, financing by selling assets in good states and
issuing equity in bad states, and financing by selling assets in both good and bad times. In what follows,
we derive the solution for a firm that applies the first funding strategy i.e. financing by issuing equity in
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good states and selling assets in bad states. The solutions for the second to fourth funding strategies can
be derived similarly. We first present the values of corporate securities after investment, and for the growth
option. We then solve for the values of corporate securities before investment by backward induction.
4.1. Value of corporate securities after investment
After exercising the expansion option, a firm consists of only invested assets, endowed with the initially
determined optimal coupon level. Let dˆi(X) denote the value of corporate debt, tˆi(X) the value of the tax
shield, and bˆi(X) the value of bankruptcy costs of a firm with only invested assets. The standard solutions
for the values of these securities are derived in Appendix A.2. The firm value after investment, vˆi(X), can
be expressed as the value of assets in place plus the tax shield minus bankruptcy costs:
vˆi(X) = (1− τ)yiX + tˆi(X)− bˆi(X). (9)
The total firm value equals the sum of debt and equity values. Hence, the equity value after investment,
eˆi(X), can be written as
eˆi(X) = vˆi(X)− dˆi(X). (10)
The default policy is chosen by equityholders to maximize the ex post value of equity. As the equity
value at the time of default corresponds to zero, this policy can be calculated by equating the first derivative
of the equity value to zero at the default boundary in each regime:{
eˆ′G(D
∗
G) = 0
eˆ′B(D
∗
B) = 0
(11)
We solve this system numerically. The value of corporate securities is solved similarly for a firm with a
scaled level of earnings after investment. The default policy is then expressed as a scaled earnings levels.
4.2. The value of the growth option
To study cyclicality of expansion options, we extend the model of Arnold, Wagner, and Westermann (2013)
by allowing regime-dependency of the additional earnings factor si, and the exercise cost Ki of the option.
For each regime i, a growth option is exercised immediately whenever X ≥ Xi (option exercise region);
otherwise, it is optimal to wait (option continuation region). This structure results in a system of ordinary
differential equations (ODEs) with associated boundary conditions given in Appendix A.3. The following
proposition presents the value of the growth option, Gi(X), in a leveraged firm (leveraged growth option) that
finances the exercise cost by issuing equity in good states, and by selling assets in bad states for XG ≤ XB.
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Proposition 1. For any given pair of exercise boundaries [XG,XB], the value of the leveraged growth option
in regime i is given by
Gi(X) =

A¯i3X γ3 + A¯i4X γ4 0≤ X < XG, i = G,B
C¯1Xβ
B
1 +C¯2Xβ
B
2 +C¯3X +C¯4 XG ≤ X < XB, i = B
(1− τ)sBXyB−KB/ΛB X ≥ XB i = B
(1− τ)sGXyG−KG(1+ϒG) X ≥ XG i = G
 , (12)
where
βB1,2 =
1
2
− µ˜B
σ˜2B
±
√(
1
2
− µ˜B
σ˜2B
)2
+
2(rB+ λ˜B)
σ˜2B
,
C¯3 = λ˜B
(1− τ)sGyG
rB− µ˜B+ λ˜B
, (13)
C¯4 = −λ˜B KB/ΛB
rB+ λ˜B
.
The parameters γ3 and γ4 correspond to the positive roots of the quadratic equation
(µ˜Bγ+
1
2
σ˜2Bγ(γ−1)− λ˜B− rB)(µ˜Gγ+
1
2
σ˜2Gγ(γ−1)− λ˜G− rG) = λ˜Bλ˜G. (14)
A¯Gk is a multiple of A¯Bk, k = 3,4, with the factor l¯k := 1λ˜G
(rG+ λ˜G− µ˜Gγk− 12 σ˜2Gγk(γk−1)) i.e. A¯Bk = l¯kA¯Gk,
and rpi is the perpetual risk-free rate given by
rpi = ri+
r j− ri
p˜+ r j
p˜ f˜ j, (15)
in which p˜ = λ˜1 + λ˜2 is the risk-neutral rate of news arrival and
(
f˜G, f˜B
)
=
(
λ˜B
p˜ ,
λ˜G
p˜
)
is the long-run risk-
neutral distribution.
[
A¯G3, A¯G4,C¯1,C¯2
]
solve a linear system given in Section Appendix A.3.
Proposition 1 determines the value of the growth option for any given pair of exercise boundaries XG ≤
XB. The optimal exercise boundaries of the leveraged growth option will be determined in the next section,
as they depend on the capital structure of the firm holding the option. Additionally, note that the value of
the growth option also depends on both the asset liquidity and the equity issuance cost.
For the derivation of the values of corporate securities before investment, we also need the value of an
unleveraged option Gunlevi that corresponds to the value of an option in an all equity financed firm. This value
does not depend on the capital structure of a firm. Hence, the optimal exercise boundaries simply maximize
the value of the option. They can, therefore, be directly derived by additionally imposing smooth-pasting
conditions at the corresponding option exercise boundaries as shown in Appendix A.3.
As we consider a regime-dependent additional earnings factor si and exercise cost Ki of the option,
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we also encounter the case in which the exercise boundary in good states, XG, is larger than the exercise
boundary in bad states, XB. It occurs when sB is considerably larger than sG, or when KB is much smaller
than KG. The solution of this case can be obtained immediately by interchanging the regime names in the
derivation of the presented solution with XG ≤ XB.
4.3. Value of corporate securities before investment
Once the values of corporate securities after investment and of the growth option are known, we can deter-
mine the values of corporate securities before investment of a firm that finances the exercise cost by issuing
equity in good times, and by selling assets in bad times. Let di(X) denote the debt value of a firm with
invested assets and an expansion option in regime i = G,B, and Gunlevi the value of an unleveraged option
derived in the Appendix A.3. Proposition 2 states the value of debt before investment.
Proposition 2. For any given set of default and exercise boundaries [DG,DB,XG,XB], the value of infinite
maturity debt in regime i is given by
di (X) =

αiΛi
(
(1− τ)Xyi+Gunlevi (X)
)
X ≤ Di, i = G,B,
C1Xβ
G
1 +C2Xβ
G
2 +C5X γ3 +C6X γ4
+λ˜G αBΛByB(1−τ)rG−µ˜G+λ˜G X +
c
rG+λ˜G
DG < X ≤ DB, i = G
Ai1X γ1 +Ai2X γ2 +Ai3X γ3 +Ai4X γ4 + crpi
DB < X ≤ XG, i = G,B
B1Xβ
B
1 +B2Xβ
B
2 +Z (X)+ λ˜B crPi (rB+λ˜B)
+ c
rB+λ˜B
XG < X ≤ XB, i = B
dˆG ((sG+1)X) X > XG, i = G
dˆB
(
(sB+1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯ yB )X
)
X > XB, i = B,
(16)
where
β i1,2 =
1
2
− µ˜i
σ˜2i
±
√(
1
2
− µ˜i
σ˜2i
)2
+
2(ri+ λ˜i)
σ˜2i
(17)
C5 = αBΛB
l¯3
l3
A¯unlevG3 , (18)
C6 = αBΛB
l¯4
l4
A¯unlevG4 , (19)
and
Z(X) = λ˜BB5X γ1 + λ˜BB6X γ2 . (20)
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The parameters B5 and B6 are given by
B5 =
(sB+1)γ1AˆG1
rB− µ˜Bγ1− 12 σ˜2Bγ1 (γ1−1)+ λ˜B
(21)
and
B6 =
(sB+1)γ2AˆG2
rB− µ˜Bγ2− 12 σ˜2Bγ2 (γ2−1)+ λ˜B
, (22)
and γk,k = 1,2,3,4 are the roots of the quadratic equation
(
µ˜Bγ+
1
2
σ˜2Bγ(γ−1)− λ˜B− rB
)(
µ˜Gγ+
1
2
σ˜2Gγ(γ−1)− λ˜G− rG
)
= λ˜Bλ˜G. (23)
ABk, k = 1,2,3,4, is a multiple of AGk with the factor
lk :=
1
λ˜G
(rG+ λ˜G− µ˜Gγk− 12 σ˜
2
Gγk(γk−1)), (24)
and rpi denotes the perpetual risk-free rate given by
rpi = ri+
r j− ri
p˜+ r j
p˜ f˜ j, (25)
in which p˜ = λ˜1 + λ˜2 is the risk-neutral rate of news arrival and
(
f˜G, f˜B
)
=
(
λ˜B
p˜ ,
λ˜G
p˜
)
is the long-run risk-
neutral distribution. dˆi (·) denotes the value of debt of a firm with only invested assets.
[AG1,AG2,AG3,AG4,C1,C2,B1,B2] solve a linear system given in Section Appendix A.4.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Proposition 2 shows that the firm faces three different regions depending on the value of X . Below the
default threshold i.e. X ≤ Di, the firm is in the default region in which it defaults immediately. Debtholders
receive a fraction αiΛi of the total after tax asset value.
The firm is in the continuation region if X is between the default threshold and the exercise boundary
i.e. if Di < X ≤ Xi. In this region, debt value is determined by three components. The first component is
the value of a risk-free claim to the perpetual stream of coupon. The second and third components reflect
the changes in the value of debt that occur either due to the idiosyncratic shock reaching a boundary or due
to a regime switch. For the region DB < X ≤ XG, where the firm is in the continuation region in both good
states and bad states, the solution consists of five terms. The value of the risk-free claim to the coupon is
given by the last term. The coupon needs to be discounted by the perpetual risk-free rate rpi that incorporates
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the expected future time spent in each regime. The first four terms capture the changes in value due to the
idiosyncratic shock X hitting a region boundary or due to a change of regime. When DG < X ≤DB, the firm
is in the continuation region only in good states, and the solution consists of six terms. The last term is the
value of the risk-free claim to the coupon, in which the discount rate is given by the interest rate in good
states, rG, increased by λ˜G to reflect the possibility of a regime switch to the bad state. The first five terms
capture the changes in debt value that occur when the idiosyncratic shock reaches a boundary or when the
regime switches to the bad state triggering immediate default. For the region XG < X ≤ XB where the firm
is in the continuation region only in bad states, the solution consists of five terms. The last term is the value
of a risk-free perpetual claim to the coupon. To account for a possible regime switch to the good state, the
discount rate is given by the interest rate in the bad state, rB, increased by λ˜B. The remaining four terms
capture the value changes due to reaching a region boundary, either XG from above or XB from below, or due
to a regime switch to a good state triggering immediate option exercise financed with equity.
Finally, the debt value in the exercise region, reached when X > Xi, incorporates the financing source
for the option exercise cost. In the good states, the option exercise cost KG is financed by issuing new equity
of KG(1+ϒG). Hence, the earnings of the firm are scaled by sG + 1. In the bad states, the exercise cost
KB is financed by selling
KB/ΛB
(1−τ)Xt¯ yB of the assets in place, such that the earnings of the firm are scaled by
(sB+1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯ yB ).
The value of the tax shield before investment can be calculated by using the solution (16) in Proposition
2, in which c and α are replaced by cτ and zero, respectively, and dˆi in the last line line of (16) is replaced
by tˆi. The value of bankruptcy costs before investment is derived by using the same steps as for debt value
with two simple modifications. First, c and α need to be replaced by zero and (1−α), respectively. Second,
while the going concern value of the expansion option is given by its leveraged value, the value of the
option at default corresponds to its unleveraged value. Therefore, the expansion option’s value switches
from Gi(X) to αiΛiGunlevi (X) upon default. As a consequence, the functional form of the solution (16) in the
default region X ≤Di needs to be adapted to (1−αiΛi)yiX(1−τ)−αiΛiGunlevi (X)+Gi(X). The Appendix
A.5 shows the resulting solution for the value of bankruptcy costs bi(X).
Next, firm value before investment, fi, in regime i = G,B is given by the value of assets in place (1−
τ)yiX , plus the growth option value Gi (X) and the value of tax benefits from debt ti(X), minus the value of
default costs bi(X) i.e.
fi(X) = (1− τ)yiX +Gi(X)+ ti(X)−bi(X). (26)
As firm value equals the sum of debt and equity values, equity values before investment of a firm that
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finances investment by issuing equity in good states and selling assets in bad states, eESi (X ,c), i = G,B, is
ei (X ,c) = fi (X)−di (X) = (1− τ)yiX +Gi (X)+ ti (X)−bi (X)−di (X) . (27)
Equity-holders select the default and investment policies that maximize the ex post value of equity.
Denote these policies by D∗i and X
∗
i , respectively. The default policy that maximizes the equity value is
determined by setting the first derivative of the equity values to zero at the default boundary in each regime.
Simultaneously, optimality of the option exercise thresholds is achieved by equating the first derivative of the
equity values at the exercise thresholds to the first derivative of the equity values of a firm with only invested
assets after expansion, evaluated at the corresponding earnings in both regimes. These four optimality
conditions represent smooth-pasting conditions for equity of a firm that finances the option exercise cost by
issuing equity in good states and selling assets in bad states at the respective boundaries:
e′G(D
∗
G,c) = 0
e′B(D
∗
B,c) = 0
e′G(X
∗
G,c) = eˆ
′
G ((sG+1)X
∗
G,c)
e′B(X
∗
B ,c) = eˆ
′
B
(
((sB+1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯ yB )X∗B),c
)
.
(28)
The system is solved numerically. As the equations in system Eqs. (28) are evaluated simultaneously, the
four conditions are interdependent. Similar systems can be derived for a firm that finances the option exercise
cost by issuing equity in both good states and bad states, by selling assets in good states and issuing equity
in bad states, or by selling assets in both good states and bad states.
Denote by em,n∗i (X ,c) the equity value given optimal ex post default and expansion thresholds. The
exponents m∈ {E,S} and n∈ {E,S} indicate the funding sources in good states and bad states, respectively.
E denotes equity financing and S selling assets. For each coupon level c, equityholders select the ex post
optimal funding source Ω∗i that maximizes the value of equity, i.e.,
Ω∗i := argmaxm,n
(
em,n∗i (X ,c)
)
. (29)
Debtholders anticipate the ex post optimal default and expansion policies, as well as the optimal funding
source chosen by shareholders. As debt-issue proceeds accrue to shareholders, they do not only care about
the value of equity, but also about the initial valuation of debt. Hence, the optimal capital structure is
determined ex ante by the coupon level c∗ that maximizes the value of equity and debt, i.e., the value of
the firm. Denote by f ∗i (X) the firm value given optimal default boundaries, expansion thresholds, and the
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optimal funding source. The ex ante optimal coupon of the firm solves
c∗i := argmaxc f
∗
i (X). (30)
To summarize, equityholders face the following decisions: First, they choose the default and expansion
thresholds that maximize the ex post value of equity for each coupon and funding source. Second, equity-
holders select the funding strategy that maximizes the ex post value of equity for each coupon. Finally, they
determine the initial capital structure that maximizes the ex ante value of equity.
5. Results
In this section, we study the implications of the model for a typical model firm. We start by describing
parameter choices for our baseline calibration before we derive the hypothesis in Section 5.2.
5.1. Parameter choice
We summarize our parameter choices in Table 2. Panel A shows the firm characteristics. The initial value
of the idiosyncratic earnings X is set to 10. While the starting value for earnings is arbitrary, our results
do not depend on this choice. We set the tax advantage of debt to τ = 0.15 as suggested in the literature
(e.g., Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec 2006). Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010) estimate growth rates
and systematic volatilities of earnings in a two-regime model. Their estimates are similar to those obtained
by other authors who jointly estimate consumption and dividends with a state-dependent drift and volatility
(e.g., Bonomo and Garcia 1996). Hence, we set earnings growth rates (µi) and volatilities (σX ,Ci ) to their em-
pirical counterparts reported in Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010). The idiosyncratic volatility is set to
0.168. Arnold, Wagner, and Westermann (2013) show that using this volatility calibration, a simulated sam-
ple of firms with growth options has an average asset volatility of approximately 25%, which corresponds
to the average asset volatility of firms with rated debt outstanding (see Schaefer and Strebulaev 2008).
INSERT TABLE 2 NEAR HERE
The main costs of external equity discussed by Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder, and Poterba (1988)
are tax costs, adverse selection premia, and flotation costs. Hansen (2001) and Corwin (2003) estimate eq-
uity issuance costs around 7% for IPOs and SEOs, respectively. Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) argue that eq-
uity costs derive mainly from the variable component. The linear variable component estimated in Hennessy
and Whited (2007) is 9.1%. Concerning cyclicality, Bayless and Caplinsky (1996) find that a typical hot
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market issuer would forego up to 2.33% in additional equity value if he would issue in a cold market instead.
To reflect these empirical quantities, we choose as a benchmark case ϒG = 0.08 and ϒB = 0.1. This setting
gives us a cyclicality for the equity issuance cost of a two percentage points difference between good and bad
states, and an average total equity issuance cost of 8.71%.11 In the comparative statics we vary the equity
issuance cost to analyze how they affect the decision of firms to sell assets to finance the investment cost.
There are only a few empirical studies that estimate the cost of selling assets. Pulvino (1998) finds costs
of selling commercial aircrafts between zero and 14%. Strebulaev (2007) assumes that the cost of selling
assets lies between 0.05 to 0.25%. Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) show that creditors of defaulted
firms recover 10 to 15 percentage points less in a distressed state of the industry than in a healthy state of the
industry, i.e., that asset liquidity is cyclical. Overall, we only have vague empirical evidence on the appropri-
ate choice of the parameters for the cost of selling assets. Hence, to avoid that our results are driven by this
choice when analyzing firms’ endogenous financing decisions, we set Λi¯ such that Ki¯/Λi¯ = Ki¯(1+ϒi¯), i.e.,
the friction adjusted cost of exercising the expansion option by selling assets corresponds to the one of ex-
ercising the expansion option by issuing new equity. This calibration yields ΛG = 0.9259 and ΛB = 0.9091.
One caveat is that equity issuance cost and asset liquidity are hard to estimate. We address this issue in
two different ways. First, we base our parameter choice on empirical results of previous works. Second, we
perform numerous robustness checks with alternative equity issuance cost and asset liquidity parameters.
We find that our qualitative predictions are not affected by varying these parameters within plausible ranges.
Bankruptcy costs are assumed to be 30% of the unleveraged assets’ liquidation proceeds. Recovery rates
are Λi(1−0.3), so they are 0.63 in good states and 0.57 in bad states. These values are in accordance with
the unconditional standard of 0.6 used in the literature (e.g. Chen 2010), and with the notion in e.g. Acharya,
Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) that recovery rates fall during bad states.
Panel B of Table 2 shows the parameters we use to capture growth options. We select exercise prices
of KG = 183.13 and KB = 160, respectively. The decline from KG to KB corresponds to the relative decline
in the value of invested assets following a shift from good to bad states of 12.61%, which is similar to the
one assumed in e.g. Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006). We validate the robustness of our predictions
by presenting the results for alternative choices of the absolute level of Ki.
The scale parameter si depends on the cyclicality of the firm’s option. We use baseline scale parameters
of sG = 1.0925 and sB = 1.03. These parameters imply that, given optimal financing at initiation, the average
q is 1.3. The q of a model firm is obtained by dividing the value of the firm by the value of its invested assets.
11 The weights for this average correspond to the long-run, risk-neutral distribution of the Markov chain. One could also simulate
a large sample of firms and determine the weights according to the occurrence of equity issues in the two states.
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To calculate the average q, the initial q in good and bad states is weighted by the long-run distribution of the
Markov chain. To generate typical firms with different degrees of the cyclicality of the expansion option,
we alter sG and sB while keeping the size of the average q at initiation fixed at its empirical counterpart.
Finally, Panel C, lists the variables describing the underlying economy. The rates of leaving regime i
(λi), the consumption growth rates (θi), and the consumption growth volatilities σCi are estimated in Bhamra,
Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010). In the model economy, the expected duration of regime B (R) is 3.68 (2.03)
years, and the average fraction of time spent in regime B (R) is 64% (36%). The annualized rate of time
preference, ρ , is 0.015; the relative risk aversion, γ , is equal to 10; and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, Ψ, is set to 1.5. This parameter choice is commonly used in the literature (e.g., Bansal and
Yaron 2004, Chen 2010). It implies that the nominal interest rates are rG = 0.0736 and rB = 0.0546.
5.2. Derivation of the model predictions
Exercising an expansion option has two implications for a firm that finances the exercise cost of the option
by issuing equity. First, it increases total earnings. Second, the total asset volatility decreases because the
expansion option is riskier than the assets in place (see e.g. Arnold, Wagner, and Westermann 2013). Both
effects induce a wealth transfer from equityholders to debtholders as debt becomes less risky. This wealth
transfer problem is more severe for firms with larger leverage. The reason is that if leverage increases, debt
becomes riskier and, consequently, more sensitive to earnings and asset volatility changes.
The wealth transfer problem has an impact on equityholders’ investment timing. The equity value max-
imizing earnings thresholds for the option exercise of a firm that finances the investment cost by issuing
equity are plotted in Figure 1. The lower solid line depicts the optimal investment threshold for various
levels of leverage in the good state. The higher solid line is the corresponding threshold in the bad state. As
expected, the firm invests earlier in the good state. We refer to the investment thresholds without debt (at
zero leverage) as the option value-maximizing threshold. The larger the leverage, the later the equityholders
invest compared to the option value-maximizing threshold due to the wealth transfer problem (underinvest-
ment). The dashed lines in Figure 1 depict the optimal investment thresholds of a firm that sells assets to
finance the exercise cost of the option. The lower dashed line is the threshold in the good state, the higher
dashed line the one in bad times. The option exercise thresholds for financing asset sales in Figure 1 are
INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE
closer to the option value-maximizing threshold, particularly for large leverage firms in which the wealth
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transfer problem is more pronounced.12 Hence, financing asset sales mitigate the underinvestment problem
compared to equity financed investment.
In the simulations, the cost of exercising the expansion option by selling assets can be larger than the
ones of exercising the expansion option by issuing new equity, i.e., Ki¯/Λi¯ may be larger than Ki¯(1+ϒi¯). At
the same time, however, selling assets upon investment increases leverage which renders debt more risky.
The corresponding wealth transfer from debtholders to equityholders ameliorates the initial wealth transfer
problem from the exercise of the expansion option. Hence, equityholders trade off the incremental friction
cost of selling assets over the equity issuance cost against the reduction in the wealth transfer when decid-
ing whether to sell assets or to issue equity to finance the exercise of the expansion option. As the wealth
transfer problem is more severe for firms with larger leverage, equityholders of such firms tend to finance
the expansion option by selling assets. This insight leads to our first model prediction.
Prediction 1. Equityholders of firms with a larger leverage have a higher tendency to finance the exercise
cost of the expansion option by selling assets.
Prediction 1 explains why we find that, empirically, the correlation between asset sales and investment
is higher for firms with larger leverage.
Figure 2 illustrates the quantitative effect of allowing equityholders into financing asset sales on the
value of a firm that starts in the good state. The solid line shows the relationship between the increase in
INSERT FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE
the value of a firm from permitting financing asset sales and the scale parameter sG for high leverage firms.
High leverage firms have an initial leverage ratio of 0.75. The remaining parameters are set according to the
baseline firm. In particular, the friction cost of selling assets corresponds to the one of issuing new equity.
Hence, we measure the pure impact of permitting financing asset sales on firm value from a mitigation of
the underinvestment problem. The dashed and dotted lines plot the relationship for medium leverage firms
with an initial leverage of 0.5 and for low leverage firms with an initial leverage of 0.35, respectively. Firm
value always increases with financing asset sales because they enable equityholders to follow a better option
exercise policy. The larger the scale parameter and the higher the leverage in Figure 2, the stronger the posi-
12 For certain parameter combinations with a high scale parameter si, and a low exercise cost Ki, financing asset sales can also
induce overinvestment such that the dashed thresholds in Figure 1 decrease with leverage. The reason is that the expansion
option is almost immediately exercised for these parameter combinations. As a consequence, the investment cost constitutes
a much larger fraction of the asset value upon exercise than for parameter combinations for which the option is exercised at a
larger level of X . Hence, the impact on leverage from financing asset sales is also larger, and the corresponding higher wealth
transfer can induce equityholders to exercise the option at an earnings level below the option value-maximizing threshold.
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tive impact of permitting financing asset sales on the value of a firm. The reason is that the mitigation of the
underinvestment problem from financing asset sales is particularly valuable if the value of the growth option
is high, and the wealth transfer problem is large due to high leverage. Our results speak to the covenant lit-
erature. First, they provide an intuition for why firms negotiate conventions in asset sale covenants that still
allow them to use financing asset sales as described in the literature (e.g., Smith and Warner 1979, Bradley
and Roberts 2004, Nini, Smith, and Sufi 2009). Second, they explain why high growth firms are typically
less likely to include restrictive asset sale covenants (e.g. Kahan and Yermack 1998, Nash, Netter, and
Poulsen 2003, Chava, Kumar, and Warga 2010, Reisel 2014). Finally, the results also induce new testable
predictions. In particular, the propensity of firms to implement restrictive asset sale covenants should be
specifically low if they have both high leverage and high growth opportunities.
We now investigate how the wealth transfer problem of the baseline firm depends on different states
of the business cycle. During bad times, leverage increases because the assets of a firm lose more value
relative to the decrease in value of the outstanding debt. At the same time, Figure 1 shows that equityhold-
ers optimally invest at a higher level of earnings in the bad state. A higher investment threshold induces
a larger asset value upon investment and hence lower leverage. To see which effect dominates, Figure 3
plots leverage upon investment for a baseline firm with an initially optimal capital structure and endogenous
choice of the funding source, in which the equity issuance cost parameter in good states, ϒG, is on the x-
axis. The corresponding equity issuance cost parameter in bad states is determined by adding 0.02. In this
way, we maintain the same difference between the equity issuance costs in good states and bad states as in
the baseline parameter specification. The dashed line depicts the leverage at investment during bad states,
the solid line is the one during good states. The bumps around ϒG = 0.075 occur due to the switch in the
firm’s optimal financing strategy. Figure 3 shows that leverage at investment is larger during bad states than
during good states. As the wealth transfer problem is more severe for higher leverage, and because asset
sales ameliorate this problem, equityholders’ trade-off between the cost of financial frictions and the wealth
transfer leads to the second model prediction.
Prediction 2. Firms are more likely to fund investments by selling assets during bad business cycle states.
Prediction 2 provides an explanation for why the correlation between asset sales and investment is sig-
nificantly higher during bad business cycle states in our Compustat sample.
INSERT FIGURE 3 NEAR HERE
The procyclical nature of aggregate investment (see e.g. Barro 1990) suggests that growth options are
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more valuable during good times than during bad times. We argue that the degree of this cyclicality of the
growth option is different across firms. To model a firm with a relatively higher value of the expansion option
in the good states, i.e., with a higher cyclicality of the expansion option, relative to the baseline firm, we
increase the scale parameter in good times, sG, from 1.0925 to 1.099, and decrease the scale parameter in bad
states, sB, from 1.03 to 1.005, leaving the average q at initiation unchanged at 1.3.13 A higher scale parameter
in good times, and a lower scale parameter in bad times make it relatively more (less) attractive to exercise
the option in the good (bad) state compared to the baseline firm. The optimal investment threshold in the
good state decreases from 20.18 to 19.67, and the one in the bad state increases from 20.48 to 22.23. Hence,
firms with a relatively higher value of the expansion option in good times have a lower probability to invest
during bad times. Additionally, Figure 4 compares leverage levels upon investment of the baseline firm to the
ones of the firm with a more valuable growth option in good states. The dotted and dashed-dotted lines depict
leverage ratios upon investment in good and bad times of the firm with a more valuable growth option in good
states. The expansion option of the baseline firm has a relatively higher value during bad times than the one
of the firm with a more cyclical growth option. Hence, the baseline firm optimally invests at a lower earnings
threshold in bad times, which induces that the asset value is lower and the leverage at investment is higher.
As the wealth transfer problem is more severe for firms with higher leverage, and because equityholders
trade off the financing cost differential between equity issuance and asset sales against the reduction in the
wealth transfer problem when selecting the funding source, we can phrase our third model prediction.
Prediction 3. Firms with a more valuable expansion option during bad business cycle states are more likely
to finance investments by selling assets during bad business cycle states than firms with a more cyclical
expansion option.
This prediction explains our empirical finding that the correlation between asset sales and investment is
higher for firms with a low cyclicality of the expansion option during bad times.
INSERT FIGURE 4 NEAR HERE
Figure 5 summarizes the implications of the wealth transfer problem upon investment on equityholders’
endogenous financing choice for the baseline firm. On the x-axis, we again plot the equity issuance cost in
good states. The y-axis shows the coupon payments that determine a firm’s leverage ratio. We are interested
in a wide range of coupon payments to replicate the cross-section of real firms that may deviate from an
13 The cyclicality of the expansion option can also be altered by changing the investment cost Ki. The qualitative predictions from
our model also hold in this case.
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optimal leverage ratio (see Section 6). On the left hand side of the solid line, equityholders optimally select
equity financing in both regimes. On the right hand side of the dashed line, firms prefer financing asset sales
in both regimes. Between the two lines the firms’ optimal financing strategy yields the issuance of equity in
good times, and selling assets in bad times. Recall that in case of the baseline firm with an equity issuance
cost of 0.08 in good states and 0.1 in bad states, the cost of selling assets, Λi, is calibrated such that the
friction cost of issuing equity corresponds to the friction cost of selling assets. In an unleveraged firm as
shown on the x-axis, equityholders simply select the funding source based on this financing friction cost: If
the equity issuance cost in good states is smaller than 0.08, they finance the exercise cost of the option by
issuing equity; otherwise, they finance this cost by selling assets. The figure shows that for larger coupon
payments, the range of equity issuance costs for which equityholders prefer equity financing in both regimes
declines, and the range for which they prefer selling assets increases. The reason is that asset sales reduce
the wealth transfer problem in particular for high leverage firms, and equityholders trade off this reduction
against the incremental friction cost of selling assets over issuing equity when selecting the funding source.
INSERT FIGURE 5 NEAR HERE
The figure also shows the higher propensity of financing assets sales in bad business cycle states. The re-
gion in which they select financing asset sales in both regimes (on the right side of the dashed line) is smaller
than the region in which they optimally sell assets during bad states (on the right side of the solid line).
6. Aggregate Dynamics of Simulated Samples
The analysis of a typical firm at initiation in Section 5.2 contributes to our understanding of the optimal
choice between asset sales and equity issuance as sources of investment financing. In this section, we follow
Strebulaev (2007) and study the aggregate dynamics of simulated model-implied economies by investigating
the cross sectional properties of corporate policies in a way that makes our results comparable to empiri-
cal evidence. The simulation approach is important for two reasons. First, the analysis of a typical firm
at initiation in Section 5.2 does not allow us to analyze the dynamic features predicted by our model. We
need to simulate the model to generate time series of investment, financing, and default observations over
the business cycles. Comparing the resulting simulated data patterns to the ones observed in our Compustat
sample enables us to validate our model. We can also measure how the propensity of model firms to use
financing asset sales relates to firm and business cycle characteristics. This analysis helps us to confirm
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our explanations for the empirical regression results on the relation between investments and financing asset
sales, and to derive new predictions on the impact of time-varying business cycle conditions on the dynamic
time serial patterns of financing asset sales.
Second, the analysis of a typical (average) firm does not consider the time evolution of the cross sec-
tional distribution of real firm characteristics. As investment, financing, and default rates are nonlinear in
firm characteristics, however, it is crucial to measure these rates for simulated samples of firms that match
the empirical cross sectional distribution of real firm characteristics. Only the dynamic features of the aver-
age rates in these simulated matched samples should then be compared to the empirical average behavior of
real firms, and be used to derive new predictions.
6.1. Details on the Simulation
For each simulation we generate an economy of model firms. We set up a grid of different firms, each
featuring a unique combination of coupon, scale parameter, and equity issuance cost. Coupons range from
two to the largest possible value such that no firm defaults immediately. The step size takes a value of two.
Scale parameters for firms with a less cyclical growth opportunity range from 0.79 in the good state and 0.73
in the bad state, and for firms with a more cyclical growth opportunity from 0.80 in the good state and 0.71
in the bad state to the largest possible value such that the option is not exercised immediately, with a step size
of 0.3. Equity issuance costs range from 0.04 to 0.09 in the good state, with a step size of 0.005. The equity
issuance cost parameter in the bad state is obtained by adding 0.02 to the corresponding value in the good
state. The remaining parameters are equal to those of the baseline firm.14 The grid contains 849 different firm
types. The earnings path of each firm type is then simulated forward 25 times over 10 years. The initial state
of the simulated economy is selected according to the long-run historical distribution of the states. Firms
are exposed to the same macroeconomic shocks, but experience different idiosyncratic shocks, resulting in a
model-implied economy populated by more than 20,000 different firms. This model-implied economy has
a broad range of leverage ratios, growth opportunities, and equity issuance costs at the last simulated date.
Next, we calculate the average leverage, Tobin’s q, and equity issuance cost for each firm in our Compu-
stat sample to match the model-implied economy to the cross sectional distribution of real firms (we define
all empirical variables in Appendix B). We consider a total of 1352 Compustat firms for which we obtain all
three measures. Firms with a q value below 1.15, and above 2.15 are winsorized because our model-implied
economies hardly contain firms with extremely low or high values of the growth option.15
14 We have verified in simulations for various alternative grids (available upon request) that the results are qualitatively identical.
15 Firms with a growth option that accounts for less than 13% of the total firm value almost never exercise their option, and firms
with a growth option that accounts for more than 54% of the total firm value almost immediately exercise their option.
26
To match the model-implied economy with their empirical counterpart we select for each observation
in the Compustat sample the firm at the last date of the simulated economy that has the minimal Euclidean
distance with respect to leverage, q, and the equity issuance cost. The matching is accurate, with an average
Euclidean distance of 0.0226. The procedure allows us to construct a cross sectional distribution of model-
implied matched firms that closely reflects its empirical counterpart. These matched firms are quarterly
simulated forward over 60 years under the historical probability measure. The equityholders of each firm
behave optimally conditional on current earnings and on the current business cycle: If current earnings are
below the corresponding regime-dependent default boundary, they default immediately; if current earnings
are above the corresponding regime-depending option exercise threshold, they exercise the expansion option
and select the optimal funding source for the option exercise cost; otherwise, equityholders take no action.
To maintain a balanced sample of firms when we simulate the matched firms over time, we exogenously
introduce new firms. In particular, we replace each defaulted or exercised firm by a new firm whose growth
option is still intact. Replaced firms have the same initial parameter values as the corresponding defaulted or
exercised firm at initiation. To ensure robustness of our results, the entire simulation is repeated 100 times.
We record and analyze the simulated matched samples.
6.2. Results for the Simulated Matched Samples
In this section, we first show that a typical simulated matched sample exhibits realistic properties to validate
our model approach. We then provide additional support for the ability of our model to explain the empirical
patterns that we observe in the Compustat data, and discuss novel predictions for financing asset sales.
Table 3 reports averages over all simulations of the mean values, as well as the standard deviations of
these mean values, for important variables of the simulated matched samples. Besides the results for the full
sample, we also provide statistics that condition on the bad and good states, respectively.
INSERT TABLE 3 NEAR HERE
The results in Table 3 show that, while firms in a simulated sample are only initially matched statically
to the average leverage, Tobin’s q, and equity issuance cost of Compustat firms, our model generates many
key dynamic properties that we observe in our empirical sample (see Appendix B, Table B1). That is, firms
in the simulated samples exhibit, on average, procyclical asset values, q values, coverage ratios, and equity
values. The average corporate leverage is countercyclical. The simulated samples also resemble several
other dynamic features of the Compustat data. For instance, as in our Compustat sample, high q firms have
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on average a lower leverage and invest more than low q firms.
Next, we investigate in more detail the dynamics of equity financing and investments predicted by a
typical simulation of a matched sample. Figure 6 shows the time series of the relative amount of firms
that issue equity in the typical sample. The shaded areas represent bad states. Our model firms exhibit
procyclical aggregate equity issuance patterns that correspond to well established findings in the empirical
literature (e.g., Choe, Masulis, and Nanda 1993, Bayless and Caplinsky 1996).
INSERT FIGURE 6 NEAR HERE
Figure 7 depicts the time series of the investment rate, which is the fraction of firms that exercise their
expansion option. The aggregate investment pattern is procyclical (see for corresponding evidence in the
empirical investment literature e.g. Barro 1990, Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power 1999).
INSERT FIGURE 7 NEAR HERE
Figure 8 shows the time series of the aggregate default rate of the typical simulated sample. Aggregate
defaults are countercyclical, and often spike in the beginning of a bad state. This pattern is consistent with
empirical observations (see e.g. Duffie, Saita, and Wang 2007, Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita 2007).
INSERT FIGURE 8 NEAR HERE
After verifying that the model features realistic sample properties, we now analyze the model’s pre-
dictions with regard to the cyclical nature of financing asset sales. Figure 9 depicts the time series of the
relative number of firms that sell assets to finance the exercise cost of the option in the typical simulated
sample. Financing asset sales are generally procyclical, mainly because there is more financing demand
from investments during good states. Yang (2008) shows that the procyclicality of asset sales can be due to
higher efficiency gains or lower financing costs during good states. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) argue
that more assets are sold in good business cycles due to firms’ refocusing in boom. Our results, though,
suggest that financing needs also contribute to the procyclical nature of asset sales.
Figure 9 also implies that a pronounced financing asset sales activity can occur in the very beginning of
a bad state. This pattern is mainly driven by firms with a less cyclical growth option that have a relatively
low investment threshold during bad states. As earnings still tend to be high in the very beginning of a bad
state when the economy just left a good state, such firms may benefit from the reduction in the investment
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cost. These investments lead to clustered financing needs that are partially covered by financing asset sales.
The clustering levels off when earnings start to decline with the duration of a recession.16
INSERT FIGURE 9 NEAR HERE
Figure 10 compares the time series of the investment rate (solid line) to the one of the financing asset
sales rate (dashed line). The distance between the dashed and solid lines decreases during bad states, which
indicates that asset sales are a relatively more important funding source for firms’ investment activities dur-
ing bad states. Hence, Figure 10 illustrates that the aggregate dynamics of asset sales and investment across
states generated by our model are consistent with our finding in the Compustat data that the correlation
between asset sales and investment is significantly higher during bad business cycle states.
INSERT FIGURE 10 NEAR HERE
In Table 4 we summarize additional features of the aggregate simulated model dynamics of financing
asset sales that corroborate our predictions from a typical firm at initiation. The conditional asset sale ratio
is the percentage of firms in the simulated matched samples that, upon investment, finance the exercise cost
of the option by selling assets. As the sources of uncertainty are well defined in our model, we do not
run regressions on the simulated samples.17 Instead, we directly use this conditional ratio in the simulated
samples to show that the wealth transfer motive of our model generates financing asset sales patterns that
are consistent with the stylized facts in the Compustat sample of Table 1.
Overall, 42% of the investments in the simulated samples are financed with asset sales. If we only
consider firms that are in the highest leverage tercile, this ratio increases to 64%. For firms in the lowest
leverage tercile, the ratio decreases to 35%. The result that highly leveraged firms in the simulated matched
samples have a higher tendency to use financing asset sales upon investment provides supports Prediction 1
and the stylized fact that the correlation between asset sales and investment increases in leverage.
INSERT TABLE 4 NEAR HERE
In bad states, the conditional asset sale ratio increases to 54%, and amounts to 38% in good states. This
finding confirms Prediction 2 that firms have a higher propensity to sell assets upon investment during bad
16 Decreasing the proportion of firms with a less cyclical growth option reduces the clustering, and, hence, the investment rate
during bad states. It does, however, not affect the relative propensity of firms to use financing asset sales during bad states.
17 There no are control variables required for financing asset sales in our simulated samples. From an econometric point of view, it
is even problematic to apply regression techniques on simulated samples because most model-firm variables are highly collinear.
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states, which is also corroborated by the increased correlation between asset sales and investment during
bad business cycle states in the real data. Finally, we analyze which firms drive the high conditional asset
sale ratio during bad times in our simulated samples. The last four rows in Table 4 report the asset sale ratios
for firms in the simulated samples with a relatively low (L) and high (H) cyclicality of the expansion option
during good and bad states, respectively. Consistent with Prediction 3, firms with a low cyclicality have the
highest ratio during bad business cycle states, which explains the stylized fact of an increased correlation
between asset sales and investments for firms with less cyclical growth options in bad states.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the decision of firms to sell assets to fund investments (financing asset sales).
We begin by documenting novel empirical patterns of financing asset sales for a sample of U.S. Compustat
firms. We find that the correlation between asset sales and investment is significantly higher (i) for firms with
higher leverage, (ii) in bad business cycle states, and (iii) for firms with a low cyclicality of the expansion
option in bad business cycle states. These stylized facts cannot be explained by traditional motives for asset
sales, such as financial distress or external financing constraints.
Against the backdrop of these stylized facts, we study a structural model with time-varying business cy-
cle conditions, embedded inside a representative agent consumption-based asset pricing framework, that en-
dogenizes the choice between asset sales and equity issuance to fund capital expenditures. Notably, equity is-
suance cost, asset liquidity, and the growth option are subject to cyclicality. Recognizing the impact of cycli-
cality on growth options, financing decisions, and asset liquidity helps understanding financing asset sales.
Our model shows that at investment, the decrease in the asset volatility and the increase in earnings make
debt less risky and, hence, transfer value from equityholders to debtholders. This mechanism leads to the
well-known wealth transfer problem that induces underinvestment (Myers 1977). On the other hand, selling
assets upon investment increases leverage, which makes debt riskier. The corresponding wealth transfer
from debtholders to equityholders ameliorates the wealth transfer problem. Notably, we show that the trade-
off between the cost of selling assets, the cost of issuing equity, and the magnitude of the wealth transfer
problem explains the empirical patterns we observe for financing asset sales in our Compustat sample.
We also simulate model-implied economies over time that are structurally similar to our Compustat
sample. The simulations generate dynamic patterns of investment, financing, default, and financing asset
sales that are similar to the ones observed empirically. We additionally find that financing asset sales are
procyclical, and can cluster at those points in time at which the economy switches from a bad to a good state.
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Overall, we contribute to identifying empirical and theoretical determinants of financing asset sales.
The observation that the wealth transfer problem can drive financing asset sales adds to our understanding
of corporate financing decisions. Our analysis of the equityholders’ choice between issuing equity and sell-
ing assets upon investment is a first step towards highlighting and studying financing asset sales. Future
work could additionally explore to what extent internal cash and debt capacity affect this choice. Moreover,
and in particular from an empirical perspective, the relationship between the wealth transfer problem and
financing asset sales should also help explaining debt covenant structures observed in corporate practice.
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Appendix A. Derivations
Appendix A.1. The stochastic discount factor, risk-free rates, and market prices of risk
Suppose the continuous-time analog of Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences of stochastic differential utility type
(e.g., Duffie and Epstein 1992a, Duffie and Epstein 1992b). The utility index Ut over a consumption process
Cs solves
Ut = EP
[∫ ∞
t
ρ
1−δ
C1−δs − ((1− γ)Us)
1−δ
1−γ
((1− γ)Us)
1−δ
1−γ −1
ds |Ft
]
, (A.1)
in which ρ determines the rate of time preference, γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion for a timeless
gamble, and Ψ := 1δ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for deterministic consumption paths.
Incorporating the separability of time and state preferences and assuming that Ψ > 1, i.e., that agents have
a preference for early resolution of uncertainty and require expected returns that increase in the uncertainty
about future consumption, are necessary to capture the impact of aggregate risk on corporate security values.
Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010) and Chen (2010) show that solving the Bellman equation asso-
ciated with the consumption problem of the representative agent yields that the stochastic discount factor mt
follows the dynamics
dmt
mt
=−ridt−ηidWCt +(eκi−1)dMt , (A.2)
in which Mt determines the compensated process associated with the Markov chain. ri are the regime-
dependent risk-free interest rates. The parameters ηi denote the risk prices for systematic Brownian shocks
affecting aggregate output. The market prices of consumption risk ηi increase in the agents’ risk aversion
and consumption volatility. κi are the relative jump sizes of the discount factor when the Markov chain
leaves state i, i.e., they are the market prices of discount factor jump risk.
Risk-free rates, and the market prices of consumption and jump risk are defined as
ri = r¯i+λi
[
γ−δ
γ−1
(
w−
γ−1
γ−δ −1
)
− (w−1−1)] , (A.3)
ηi = γσCi , (A.4)
κi = (δ − γ) log
(
h j
hi
)
, (A.5)
with i, j = G,B, i 6= j. The parameters hG,hB solve the following non-linear system of equations (e.g.
Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev 2010):
0 = ρ
( 1− γ
1−δ
)
hδ−γi +
(
(1− γ)θi− 12γ (1− γ)
(
σCi
)2−ρ 1− γ
1−δ
)
h1−γi +λi
(
h1−γj −h1−γi
)
(A.6)
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The risk-free rates ri consist of the interest rate if the economy stayed in regime i forever, r¯i, plus a second
term adjusting for possible regime switches. The no-jump part of the interest rates, r¯i, is given by
r¯i = ρ+δθi− 12γ (1+δ )
(
σCi
)2
, (A.7)
and
w := eκB = e−κG (A.8)
measures the size of the jump in the real-state price density when the economy shifts from bad states to good
states (see for example Proposition 1 in Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev 2010).
Appendix A.2. Derivation of the values of corporate securities after investment
The valuation of corporate debt. Our valuation of corporate debt of a firm that consists of only invested
assets in a two regime setting follows (Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec 2006). We consider the case in which
the default boundary in good states is lower than the one in bad states, i.e., DˆG < DˆB. If the firm defaults,
debtholders receive a fraction Λiαi of the unleveraged after tax asset value (1− τ)Xyi. A debt investor
requires an instantaneous return equal to the risk-free rate ri. The instantaneous debt return corresponds to
the realized rate of return plus the coupon proceeds from debt. Therefore, an application of Ito’s lemma with
regime switches shows that debt satisfies the following system of ODEs.
For 0≤ X ≤ DˆG : {
dˆG(X) = αGΛG(1− τ)XyG
dˆB(X) = αBΛB(1− τ)XyB.
(A.9)
For DˆG < X ≤ DˆB :{
rGdˆG(X) = c+ µ˜GXdˆ′G(X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
GX
2dˆ′′G(X)+ λ˜G
(
αBΛB(1− τ)XyB− dˆG(X)
)
dˆB(X) = αBΛB(1− τ)XyB.
(A.10)
For X > DˆB : {
rGdˆG(X) = c+ µ˜GXdˆ′G(X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
GX
2dˆ′′G(X)+ λ˜G
(
dˆB(X)− dˆG(X)
)
rBdˆB(X) = c+ µ˜BXdˆ′B(X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
BX
2dˆ′′B(X)+ λ˜B
(
dˆG(X)− dˆB(X)
)
.
(A.11)
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The boundary conditions read
lim
X→∞
dˆi (X)
X
< ∞, i = G,B, (A.12)
lim
X↘DˆB
dˆG(X) = lim
X↗DˆB
dˆG(X), (A.13)
lim
X↘DˆB
dˆ′G(X) = lim
X↗DˆB
dˆ′G(X), (A.14)
lim
X↘DˆG
dˆG (X) = αGΛG(1− τ)DGyG, (A.15)
and
lim
X↘DˆG
dˆB (X) = αBΛB(1− τ)DByB. (A.16)
Condition (A.12) expresses the no-bubbles condition. The remaining boundary conditions are the value-
matching conditions (A.13), (A.15), and (A.16), and the smooth-pasting condition at the higher default
threshold DˆB for the debt function in the good state dˆG(·), Eq. (A.14). The functional form of the solution is
dˆi(X) =

αiΛi(1− τ)Xyi X ≤ Dˆi i = G,B
Cˆ1Xβ
G
1 +Cˆ2Xβ
G
2 +C3X +C4 DˆG < X ≤ DˆB, i = G
Aˆi1X γ1 + Aˆi2X γ2 +Ai5 X > DˆB, i = G,B,
(A.17)
in which AˆG1, AˆG2, AˆB1, AˆB2,AG5,AB5,Cˆ1,Cˆ2,C3,C4,γ1,γ2,βG1 , and β
G
2 are real-valued parameters to be de-
termined.
First, consider the region X > DˆB. We start by using the standard approach of plugging the functional
form dˆi(X) = Aˆi1X γ1 + Aˆi2X γ2 +Ai5 into both equations of (A.11). Comparing coefficients and solving the
resulting two-dimensional system of equations for Ai5, we find that
Ai5 =
c (r j + λ˜i+ λ˜ j)
rir j + r jλ˜i+ riλ˜ j
=
c
rpi
, (A.18)
and that AˆGk is always a multiple of AˆBk, k = 1,2, with the factor lk := 1λ˜G
(rG+ λ˜G− µ˜Gγk− 12 σ˜2Gγk(γk−1)),
i.e., AˆBk = lkAˆGk. Using these results when comparing coefficients again, it can be shown that γ1 and γ2 are
the negative roots of the quadratic equation
(µ˜Bγ+ 12 σ˜
2
Bγ(γ−1)− λ˜B− rB)(µ˜Gγ+ 12 σ˜2Gγ(γ−1)− λ˜G− rG) = λ˜Bλ˜G. (A.19)
Due to the no-bubbles condition for debt stated in Eq. (A.12), we take the negative roots.
Next, we solve the region DˆG ≤ X ≤ DˆB. Plugging the functional form dG(X) = Cˆ1XβG1 + Cˆ2XβG2 +
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C3X +C4 into the first equation of (A.10), we find by comparison of coefficients that
βG1,2 =
1
2
− µ˜G
σ˜2G
±
√(
1
2
− µ˜G
σ˜2G
)2
+
2(rG+ λ˜G)
σ˜2G
C3 =
λ˜GαBΛB(1− τ)yB
rG+ λ˜G− µ˜G
(A.20)
C4 =
c
rG+ λ˜G
.
We then plug the functional form (A.17) into conditions (A.13)–(A.16), and obtain a four-dimensional linear
system in the remaining four unknown parameters AˆG1, AˆG2,Cˆ1, and Cˆ2 :
AˆG1Dˆ
γ1
B + AˆG2Dˆ
γ2
B +AG5 = Cˆ1Dˆ
βG1
G +Cˆ2Dˆ
βG2
B +C3DˆB+C4
AˆG1γ1Dˆ
γ1
B + AˆG2γ2Dˆ
γ2
B = Cˆ1β
G
1 Dˆ
βG1
B +Cˆ2β
G
2 Dˆ
βG2
B +C3DˆB
αGΛG(1− τ)DˆGyG = Cˆ1Dˆβ
G
1
B +Cˆ2Dˆ
βG2
B +C3DˆB+C4
l1AˆG1Dˆ
γ1
B + l2AˆG2Dˆ
γ2
B +AB5 = αBΛB(1− τ)DˆByB.
(A.21)
Define the matrices
Mˆ :=

Dˆγ1B Dˆ
γ2
B −Dˆβ
G
1
B −Dˆβ
G
2
B
γ1Dˆ
γ1
B γ2Dˆ
γ2
B −βG1 Dˆ
βG1
B −βG2 Dˆ
βG2
B
0 0 Dˆβ
G
1
B Dˆ
βG2
B
l1Dˆ
γ1
B l2Dˆ
γ2
B 0 0
 (A.22)
and
bˆ :=

C3DˆB+C4−AG5
C3DˆB
αGΛG(1− τ)DˆGyG−C3DˆB−C4
αBΛB(1− τ)DˆByB−AB5
 , (A.23)
such that Mˆ
[
AˆG1 AˆG2 Cˆ1 Cˆ2
]T
= bˆ. The solution for the unknown parameters is given by
[
AˆG1 AˆG2 Cˆ1 Cˆ2
]T
= Mˆ−1bˆ. (A.24)
The value of the tax shield can be calculated by the formula for the value of debt, in which c is replaced
by τc, and α is equal to zero. The value of bankruptcy costs is simply obtained by replacing c by zero, and
α by 1−α .
Default policy. The value of equity corresponds to the firm value minus the value of debt. The firm value
is given by the value of assets in place plus the value of the option and the tax shield minus default costs.
35
Once debt has been issued, managers select the ex post default policy that maximizes the value of equity.
Formally, the default policy is determined by equating the first derivative of the equity value to zero at the
corresponding default boundary: {
eˆ′G(Dˆ
∗
G) = 0
eˆ′B(Dˆ
∗
B) = 0.
(A.25)
We solve this problem numerically.
For a firm that receives scaled earnings after investment, the value of corporate securities is solved
similarly by replacing X with the scaled level of earnings. For example, if the firm exercises the option in
the good state, and finances the exercise cost by issuing equity, the scaled earnings correspond to (sG+1)X .
The default boundaries Dˆ∗G and Dˆ
∗
B are then expressed in terms of the scaled earnings levels.
Appendix A.3. Derivation of the value of the growth option
The case in which XG < XB:
We present the derivation of the value of the growth option for a firm that finances the option exercise
by issuing equity in good states and selling assets in bad states. The value of the growth option for a firm
with an alternative financing strategy can be derived similarly. For each regime i, the option is exercised
immediately whenever X ≥ Xi (option exercise region); otherwise, it is optimal to wait (option continuation
region). This structure results in the following system of ODEs for the value function.
For 0≤ X < XG :{
rGGG(X) = µ˜GXG′G(X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
GX
2G′′G(X)+ λ˜G (GB(X)−GG(X))
rBGB(X) = µ˜BXG′B(X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
BX
2G′′B(X)+ λ˜B (GG(X)−GB(X)) .
(A.26)
For XG ≤ X < XB :{
GG(X) = (1− τ)sGXyG−KG(1+ϒG)
rBGB(X) = µ˜BXG′B(X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
BX
2G′′B(X)+ λ˜B ((1− τ)sGXyG−KB(1+ϒB)−GB(X)) .
(A.27)
For X ≥ XB : {
GG(X) = (1− τ)sGXyG−KG(1+ϒG)
GB(X) = (1− τ)sBXyB−KB/ΛB.
(A.28)
Whenever the process X is in the option continuation region, which corresponds to system (A.26) and the
second equation of (A.27), the required rate of return ri (left-hand side) must be equal to the realized rate
of return (right-hand side). The realized rate of return is calculated by applying Ito’s lemma for regime
switches. In this region, the last term captures the possible jump in the value of the growth option due to
a regime switch. It can be expressed as the instantaneous probability of a regime shift, λ˜G or λ˜B, times the
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associated change in the value of the option. The first equation of (A.27) and the system (A.28) state the
payoff of the option at exercise. The process is in the option exercise region in these cases. The boundary
conditions are given by
lim
X↘0
Gi (X) = 0, i = G,B, (A.29)
lim
X↘XG
GB(X) = lim
X↗XG
GB(X), (A.30)
lim
X↘XG
G′B(X) = limX↗XG
G′B(X), (A.31)
lim
X↗XB
GB (X) = (1− τ)sBXByB−KB/ΛB, (A.32)
and
lim
X↗XG
GG (X) = (1− τ)sGXGyG−KG(1+ϒG). (A.33)
Condition (A.29) ensures that the option value goes to zero as earnings approach zero. Conditions (A.30)
and (A.31) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions of the value function in bad times at the
exercise boundary in good times. The remaining conditions (A.32)–(A.33) are the value-matching condi-
tions at the exercise boundaries in a good state and a bad state, respectively.
The functional form of the solution is given by
Gi(X) =

A¯i3X γ3 + A¯i4X γ4 0≤ X < XG, i = G,B
C¯1Xβ
B
1 +C¯2Xβ
B
2 +C¯3X +C¯4 XG ≤ X < XB, i = B
(1− τ)sBXyB−KB/ΛB X ≥ XB i = B
(1− τ)sGXyG−KG(1+ϒG) X ≥ XG i = G
(A.34)
in which A¯G3, A¯G4, A¯B1, A¯B2,C¯1,C¯2,C¯3,C¯4,γ3,γ4,βB1 , and βB2 are real-valued parameters to be determined.
First, consider the region 0 ≤ X < XG, and plug the functional form Gi(X) = A¯i3X γ3 + A¯i4X γ4 into both
equations of (A.26). Comparison of coefficients shows that A¯Gk is a multiple of A¯Bk, k = 3,4, with the factor
l¯k := 1λ˜G
(rG+ λ˜G− µ˜Gγk− 12 σ˜2Gγk(γk−1)), i.e., A¯Bk = l¯kA¯Gk. Using this result when comparing coefficients,
we find that γ3 and γ4 correspond to the positive roots of the quadratic equation
(µ˜Bγ+
1
2
σ˜2Bγ(γ−1)− λ˜B− rB)(µ˜Gγ+
1
2
σ˜2Gγ(γ−1)− λ˜G− rG) = λ˜Bλ˜G. (A.35)
The reason for taking the positive roots is given by boundary condition (A.29).
Next, consider the region XG ≤ X < XB. Plugging the functional form GB(X) = C¯1Xβ1 +C¯2Xβ2 +C¯3X +
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C¯4 into the second equation of (A.27), we find by comparison of coefficients that
βB1,2 =
1
2
− µ˜B
σ˜2B
±
√(
1
2
− µ˜B
σ˜2B
)2
+
2(rB+ λ˜B)
σ˜2B
,
C¯3 = λ˜B
(1− τ)sGyG
rB− µ˜B+ λ˜B
, (A.36)
C¯4 = −λ˜B KB/ΛB
rB+ λ˜B
.
The remaining unknown parameters are A¯G3, A¯G4,C¯1, and C¯2. Plugging the functional form (A.34) into
conditions (A.30)–(A.33) yields
C¯1X
βB1
G +C¯2X
βB2
G +C¯3XG+C¯4 = l¯3A¯G3X
γ3
G + l¯4A¯G4X
γ4
G , (A.37)
C¯1βB1 X
βB1
G +C¯2β
B
2 X
βB2
G +C¯3XG = l¯3A¯G3γ3X
γ3
G + l¯4γ4A¯G4X
γ4
G , (A.38)
C¯1X
βB1
B +C¯2X
βB2
B +C¯3XB+C¯4 = (1− τ)sByBXB−KB/ΛB, (A.39)
and
A¯G3X
γ3
G + A¯G4X
γ4
G = (1− τ)sGyGXG−KG(1+ϒG). (A.40)
This four-dimensional system is linear in its four unknowns A¯G3, A¯G4,C¯1 and C¯2. We define the matrices
M¯ :=

l¯3X
γ3
G l¯4X
γ4
G −X
βB1
G −X
βB2
G
l¯3γ3X
γ3
G l¯4γ4X
γ4
G −βB1 X
βB1
G −βB2 X
βB2
G
0 0 Xβ
B
1
B X
βB2
B
X γ3G X
γ4
G 0 0
 , (A.41)
and
b¯ :=

C¯3XG+C¯4
C¯3XG
−C¯3XB−C¯4+(1− τ)sByBXB−KB/ΛB
(1− τ)sGyGXG−KG(1+ϒG)
 , (A.42)
such that M¯
[
A¯G3 A¯G4 C¯1 C¯2
]T
= b¯. The solution to the remaining four unknowns is given by
[
A¯G3 A¯G4 C¯1 C¯2
]T
= M¯−1b¯. (A.43)
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The unleveraged value of the growth option. The unleveraged value of the growth option is calculated
by additionally imposing the smooth-pasting boundary conditions at option exercise:
lim
X↗XunlevB
Gunlev
′
B (X) = (1− τ)sByB (A.44)
and
lim
X↗XunlevG
Gunlev
′
G (X) = (1− τ)sGyG. (A.45)
The solution method is analog to the one for the leveraged option value up to and including Eq. (A.36).
The system of equations (A.37)–(A.40) is augmented by the two equations corresponding to the additional
smooth-pasting boundary conditions:
C¯unlev1 β
B
1
(
XunlevB
)βB1 −1
+C¯unlev2 β
B
2
(
XunlevB
)βB2 −1
+C¯3 = (1− τ)sByB (A.46)
and
A¯unlevG3 γ3
(
XunlevG
)γ3−1
+ A¯unlevG4 γ4
(
XunlevG
)γ4−1
= (1− τ)sGyG. (A.47)
The full system is six-dimensional with the six unknowns A¯unlevG3 , A¯
unlev
G4 ,C¯
unlev
1 , C¯
unlev
2 X
unlev
G , and X
unlev
B , lin-
ear in the first four unknowns and nonlinear in the last two unknowns. It is solved numerically.
The case in which XG ≥ XB:
The solution of the case XG ≥ XB can be obtained immediately by renaming regimes in the solution of
the presented case for XG < XB.
Appendix A.4. Firms with invested assets and an expansion option
We first present a proof for the valuation of corporate debt in the case in which DG < DB, DˆG < DˆB, and
XB > XG.
Proof of Proposition 2. An investor requires an instantaneous return equal to the risk-free rate ri for hold-
ing corporate debt. The application of Ito’s lemma with regime switches shows that debt must, consequently,
satisfy the following system of ODEs.
39
For 0≤ X ≤ DG : {
dG (X) = αGΛG
(
(1− τ)XyG+GunlevG (X)
)
dB (X) = αBΛB
(
(1− τ)XyB+GunlevB (X)
)
.
(A.48)
For DG < X ≤ DB :
rGdG (X) = c+ µ˜GXd′G (X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
GX
2d′′G (X)
+λ˜G
(
αBϒB
(
(1− τ)XyB+GunlevB (X)
)−dG (X))
dB (X) = αBΛB
(
(1− τ)XyB+GunlevB (X)
)
.
(A.49)
For DB < X < XG :{
rGdG (X) = c+ µ˜GXd′G (X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
GX
2d′′G (X)+ λ˜G (dB (X)−dG (X))
rBdB (X) = c+ µ˜BXd′B (X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
BX
2d′′B (X)+ λ˜B (dG (X)−dB (X)) .
(A.50)
For XG ≤ X < XB :{
dG (X) = dˆG ((sG+1)X)
rBdB (X) = c+ µ˜BXd′B (X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
BX
2d′′B (X)+ λ˜B
(
dˆG ((sG+1)X)−dB (X)
)
.
(A.51)
For X ≥ XB : {
dG (X) = dˆG ((sG+1)X)
dB (X) = dˆB
(
(sB+1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯ yB )X
)
.
(A.52)
In system (A.48), the firm is in the default region in both good states and bad times. In this region, debthold-
ers receive αiΛi
(
(1− τ)Xyi+Gunlevi (X)
)
at default. The firm is in the continuation region in good state, and
in the default region in bad states in system (A.49). For the continuation region in good states , the left-hand
side of the first equation is the rate of return required by investors for holding corporate debt for one unit of
time. The right-hand side is the realized rate of return, computed by Ito’s lemma as the expected change in
the value of debt plus the coupon payment c. The last term expresses the possible jump in the value of debt
in case of a regime switch, that triggers immediate default. Eqs. (A.50) describe the case in which the firm is
in the continuation region in both good and bad states. The next system, (A.51), treats the case in which the
firm is in the exercise region in good states and in the continuation region in bad states. After exercising the
option, the firm owns total assets in place with value (1−τ)Xyi+(1−τ)si¯Xyi, reflecting the notion that the
exercise cost of the growth option can be financed by issuing equity in good states. The value of debt must
then be equal to the value of debt of a firm with only invested assets, i.e., dG(X) = dˆG((sG+1)X), which is
the first equation in (A.51). The second equation in this case is obtained by the same approach as in (A.50).
The last term captures the notion that a regime switch from bad states to good states triggers immediate
exercise of the expansion option with equity financing. Finally, (A.52) describes the case in which the firm
is in the exercise region in both good and bad states. In good states, the earnings of the firm are scaled by
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sG+1. In bad states, the exercise cost KB is financed by selling
KB/ΛB
(1−τ)Xt¯ yB of the assets in place, such that the
earnings of the firm are scaled by (sB+1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯ yB ).
The system is subject to the following boundary conditions.
lim
X↘DB
dG (X) = lim
X↗DB
dG (X) , (A.53)
lim
X↘DB
d′G (X) = limX↗DB
d′G (X) , (A.54)
lim
X↘DG
dG (X) = αGΛG
(
(1− τ)DGyG+GunlevG (DG)
)
, (A.55)
lim
X↘DB
dB (X) = αBΛB
(
(1− τ)DByB+GunlevB (DB)
)
, (A.56)
lim
X↘XG
dB (X) = lim
X↗XG
dB (X) , (A.57)
lim
X↘XG
d′B (X) = limX↗XG
d′B (X) , (A.58)
lim
X↗XG
dG (X) = dˆG ((sG+1)XG) , (A.59)
and
lim
X↗XB
dB (XB) = dˆB
(
(sB+1− KB/ΛB
(1− τ)Xt¯yB )XB
)
. (A.60)
Eqs. (A.53) and (A.54) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions for the debt value in the good
state at the default boundary of the bad state. Eqs. (A.57) and (A.58) are the corresponding conditions for
the debt value in the bad state at the option exercise boundary of the good state. Eqs. (A.55) and (A.56) show
the value-matching conditions at the default thresholds, and Eqs. (A.59) and (A.60) are the value-matching
conditions at the option exercise boundaries. The default thresholds and option exercise boundaries are
chosen by equityholders. Hence, we do not have the corresponding smooth-pasting conditions for debt.
To solve this system, we start with the functional form of the solution in which
AG1,AG2,AB1,AB2,C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,C6,B1,B2,B4,βG1 ,β
G
2 ,β
B
1 ,βB2 ,γ1,γ2,γ3, and γ4 are real-valued parame-
ters to be determined (or to be confirmed).
We first consider the region DB < X ≤ XG. Plugging the functional form di(X) = Ai1X γ1 +Ai2X γ2 +
Ai3X γ3 +Ai4X γ4 +Ai5 into both equations of (A.50) and comparing coefficients, we find that
Ai5 =
c(r j + λ˜i+ λ˜ j)
rir j + r jλ˜i+ riλ˜ j
=
c
rpi
. (A.61)
As in Appendix A.2, AGk is always a multiple of ABk, k = 1, . . . ,4, with the factor lk := 1λ˜G
(rG + λ˜G−
µ˜Gγk− 12 σ˜2Gγk(γk− 1)), i.e., ABk = lkAGk. Using this relation and comparing coefficients, it can be shown
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that γ1,γ2,γ3, and γ4 correspond to the roots of the quadratic equation
(µ˜Bγ+ 12 σ˜
2
Bγ(γ−1)− λ˜B− rB)(µ˜Gγ+ 12 σ˜2Gγ(γ−1)− λ˜G− rG) = λ˜Bλ˜G. (A.62)
According to Guo (2001), this quadratic equation always has two negative and two positive distinct real
roots. The value of debt in both regimes is subject to boundary conditions from below (default) and above
(exercise of expansion option). To meet all boundary conditions, we use four terms with the corresponding
factors Aik as well as the exponents γk, which requires the usage of all four roots of Eq. (A.62). The no-
bubbles condition is not considered again because it is already implemented in the value function dˆi of a
firm with only invested assets. The unknown parameters for this region are AGk, k = 1, . . . ,4.
Next, we examine the region DG ≤ X ≤ DB. Plugging the functional form dG(X) =C1XβG1 +C2XβG2 +
C3X +C4+C5X γ3 +C6X γ4 into the second equation of (A.49), we find by comparison of coefficients that
βG1,2 =
1
2
− µ˜G
σ˜2G
±
√(
1
2
− µ˜G
σ˜2G
)2
+
2(rG+ λ˜G)
σ˜2G
, (A.63)
C3 = λ˜G
αBΛB(1− τ)yB
rG+ λ˜G− µ˜G
, (A.64)
C4 =
c
rG+ λ˜G
, (A.65)
C5 = αBΛB
l¯3
l3
A¯unlevG3 , (A.66)
and
C6 = αBΛB
l¯4
l4
A¯unlevG4 . (A.67)
The unknown parameters remaining in this region are C1 and C2.
Finally, we consider the region XG < X ≤ XB. Plugging the functional form B1XβB1 +B2XβB2 +Z (X)+
λ˜B crPi (rB+λ˜B)
+ c
rB+λ˜B
into the second equation of (A.51) and comparing coefficients, we find that
Z(X) = λ˜BB5X γ1 + λ˜BB6X γ2 . (A.68)
(A.69)
The parameters B5 and B6 are given by
B5 =
(sB+1)γ1AˆG1
rB− µ˜Bγ1− 12 σ˜2Bγ1 (γ1−1)+ λ˜B
, (A.70)
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and
B6 =
(sB+1)γ2AˆG2
rB− µ˜Bγ2− 12 σ˜2Bγ2 (γ2−1)+ λ˜B
. (A.71)
The unknown parameters remaining in this region are B1 and B2.
To solve for the unknown parameters AG1,AG2,AG3,AG4,C1,C2,B1, and B2, we plug the functional form
(16) into the system of boundary conditions (A.53)–(A.60):
4
∑
k=1
AGkD
γk
B +AG5 = C1D
βG1
B +C2D
βG2
B +C3X +C4+C5X
γ3 +C6X γ4
4
∑
k=1
AGkγkD
γk
B = C1β
G
1 D
βG1
B +C2β
G
2 D
βG2
B +C3X +C5γ3X
γ3 +C6γ4X γ4
αGΛG
(
(1+ τ)DGyG+GunlevG (DG)
)
= C1D
βG1
G +C2D
βG2
G +C3DG+C4+C5D
γ3
G +C6D
γ4
G
4
∑
k=1
lkAGkD
γk
B +AB5 = αBΛB
(
(1+ τ)DByB+GunlevB (DB)
)
4
∑
k=1
lkAGkX
γk
G +AB5 = B1X
βB1
G +B2X
βB2
G +Z(XG)+B4 (A.72)
4
∑
k=1
lkAGkγkX
γk
G = B1β
B
1 X
βB1
G +B2β
B
2 X
βB2
G +XGZ
′(XG)
4
∑
k=1
AGkX
γk
G +AG5 = dˆG ((sG+1)XG)
B1X
βB1
B +B2X
βB2
B +Z(XB)+B4 = dˆB
(
(sB+1− KB/ΛB
(1− τ)Xt¯yB )XB
)
.
Using matrix notation, we can write
M :=

Dγ1B D
γ2
B D
γ3
B D
γ4
B −Dβ
G
1
B −Dβ
G
2
B 0 0
γ1D
γ1
B γ2D
γ2
B γ3D
γ3
B γ4D
γ4
B −βG1 D
βG1
B −βG2 D
βG2
B 0 0
0 0 0 0 Dβ
G
1
G D
βG2
G 0 0
l1D
γ1
B l2D
γ2
B l3D
γ3
B l4D
γ4
B 0 0 0 0
l1X
γ1
G l2X
γ2
G l3X
γ3
G l4X
γ4
G 0 0 −X
βB1
G −X
βB2
G
l1γ1X
γ1
G l2γ2X
γ2
G l3γ3X
γ3
G l4γ4X
γ4
G 0 0 −βB1 X
βB1
G −βB2 X
βB2
G
X γ1G X
γ2
G X
γ3
G X
γ4
G 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 Xβ
B
1
B X
βB2
B

(A.73)
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and
b :=

−AG5+C3DB+C4+C5Dγ1B +C6Dγ2B
C3DB+ γ1C5D
γ1
B + γ2C6D
γ2
B
−C3DG−C4−C5Dγ3G −C6Dγ4G +αGΛG
(
(1− τ)DGyG+GunlevG (DG)
)
−AB5+αBΛB
(
(1− τ)DByB+GunlevB (DB)
)
−AB5+Z (XG)+B4
XGZ
′ (XG)
−AG5+ dˆG ((sG+1)XG)
−Z (XB)+B4+ dˆB
(
(sB+1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯ yB )XB
)

. (A.74)
The solution to the remaining unknowns is now given by
[
AG1 AG2 AG3 AG4 C1 C2 B1 B2
]T
= M−1b. (A.75)
The case in which DG < DB, DˆG < DˆB, and XG > XB:
Going through the same steps as in the previous case gives us
M :=

Dγ1B D
γ2
B D
γ3
B D
γ4
B −Dβ
G
1
B −Dβ
G
2
B 0 0
γ1D
γ1
B γ2D
γ2
B γ3D
γ3
B γ4D
γ4
B −βG1 D
βG1
B −βG2 D
βG2
B 0 0
0 0 0 0 Dβ
G
1
G D
βG2
G 0 0
l1D
γ1
B l2D
γ2
G l3D
γ3
B l4D
γ4
B 0 0 0 0
X γ1B X
γ2
B X
γ3
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(A.76)
and
b :=

−AG5+C3DB+C4+C5Dγ1B +C6Dγ2B
C3DB+ γ1C5D
γ1
B + γ2C6D
γ2
B
−C3DG−C4−C5Dγ3G −C6Dγ4G +αGΛG
(
(1− τ)DGyG+GunlevG (DG)
)
−AB5+αBΛB
(
(1− τ)DByB+GunlevB (DB)
)
−AG5+Z (XB)+B4
XBZ
′ (XB)
−AB5+ dˆB
(
(sB+1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯ yB )XB
)
−Z (XG)+B4+ dˆG ((sG+1)XG)

. (A.77)
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The solution to the unknowns is again given by
[
AG1 AG2 AG3 AG4 C1 C2 B1 B2
]T
= M−1b. (A.78)
Appendix A.5. Bankruptcy costs
For the calculation of bankruptcy costs, the ODEs are given by the following system:
For 0≤ X ≤ DG :{
bG (X) = (1−αGΛG)(1− τ)XyG+GG (X)−αGΛGGunlevG (X)
bB (X) = (1−αBΛB)(1− τ)XyB+GB (X)−αBΛBBunlevB (X) .
(A.79)
For DG < X ≤ DB :
rGbG (X) = µ˜GXb′G (X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
GX
2b′′G (X)
+λ˜G
(
(1−αBΛB)(1− τ)XyB+GB (X)−αBΛBGunlevB (X)−bG (X)
)
bB (X) = (1−αBΛB)(1− τ)XyB+GB (X)−αBΛBGunlevB (X) .
(A.80)
For DB < X < XG :{
rGdG (X) = c+ µ˜GXb′G (X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
GX
2b′′G (X)+ λ˜G (bB (X)−bG (X))
rBdB (X) = c+ µ˜BXd′B (X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
BX
2b′′B (X)+ λ˜B (bG (X)−bB (X)) .
(A.81)
For XG ≤ X < XB :{
bG (X) = dˆG ((sG+1)X)
rdB (X) = c+ µ˜BXb′B (X)+
1
2 σ˜
2
BX
2b′′B (X)+ λ˜B
(
dˆG ((sG+1)X)−bB (X)
)
.
(A.82)
For X ≥ XB : {
bG (X) = bˆG ((sG+1)X)
bB (X) = bˆB
(
(sB+1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯ yB )X
)
.
(A.83)
The boundary conditions are as follows:
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lim
X↘DB
bG (X) = lim
X↗DB
bG (X) , (A.84)
lim
X↘DB
b′G (X) = limX↗DB
b′G (X) , (A.85)
lim
X↘DG
bG (X) = (1−αGΛB)(1− τ)DGyG+GG (DG)−αGΛGGunlevG (DG) , (A.86)
lim
X↘DB
bB (X) = (1−αGΛG)(1− τ)DByB+GB (DB)−αBGunlevB (DB) , (A.87)
lim
X↘XG
bB (X) = lim
X↗XG
bB (X) , (A.88)
lim
X↘XG
b′B (X) = limX↗XG
b′B (X) , (A.89)
lim
X↗XG
bG (X) = bˆG ((sG+1)XG) , (A.90)
and
lim
X↗XB
bB (XB) = bˆB
(
(sB+1− KB/ΛB
(1− τ)Xt¯yB )XB
)
. (A.91)
Eqs. (A.84) and (A.85) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions for bankruptcy costs in good
states at the default boundary in bad states. Similarly, Eqs. (A.88) and (A.89) are the corresponding con-
ditions for bankruptcy costs in bad states at the option exercise boundary in good states. Eqs. (A.86) and
(A.87) are the value-matching conditions at the default thresholds. They incorporate the fact that upon de-
fault, the value of the leveraged growth option switches to the value of the unleveraged growth option. Eqs.
(A.90) and (A.91) are the value-matching conditions at the option exercise boundaries.
To solve for the unknown parameters, we plug the functional form
bi (X) =

(1−αiΛi)(1− τ)Xyi−αiΛiGunlevi (X)+Gi(X) X ≤ Di, i = G,B
C1Xβ
B
1 +C2Xβ
B
2 +C5X γ3 +C6X γ4
+λ˜G αBΛByB(1−τ)rG−µ˜G+λ˜G X +
c
rG+λ˜G
DG < X ≤ DB, i = G
Ai1X γ1 +Ai2X γ2 +Ai3X γ3 +Ai4X γ4 + crpi
DB < X ≤ XG, i = G,B
B1Xβ
B
1 +B2Xβ
B
2 +Z (X)+ λ˜B crPi (rB+λ˜B)
+ c
rB+λ˜B
XG < X ≤ XB, i = B
bˆG ((sG+1)X) X > XG, i = G
bˆB
(
(sB+1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯ yB )X
)
X > XB, i = B
(A.92)
into the system of boundary conditions (A.84)-(A.91). The solution to the unknowns is given by
[
AG1 AG2 AG3 AG4 C1 C2 B1 B2
]T
= M−1b, (A.93)
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where
M :=

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1
B X
βB2
B

, (A.94)
b :=

−AG5+C3DB+C4+C5Dγ1B +C6Dγ2B
C3DB+ γ1C5D
γ1
B + γ2C6D
γ2
B
−C3DG−C4−C5Dγ3G −C6Dγ4G +(1−αGΛG)
(
(1− τ)DGyG−αGΛGGunlevG (DG)
)
+GG(DG)
−AB5+(1−αBΛB)
(
(1− τ)DByB−αBΛBGunlevB (DB)
)
+GB(DB)
−AB5+Z (XG)+B4
XGZ
′ (XG)
−AG5+ dˆG ((sG+1)XG)
−Z (XB)+B4+ dˆB
(
(sB+1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯ yB )XB
)

,
(A.95)
C5 =
l¯3
l3
(
A¯levG3−αBΛBA¯unlevG3
)
, (A.96)
and
C6 =
l¯4
l4
(
A¯levG4−αBΛBA¯unlevG4
)
. (A.97)
The case in which DG < DB, DˆG < DˆB, and XG > XB:
This case can be solved similarly.
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Appendix B. Data and Variables
Our sample includes all U.S. manufacturing firms (SIC codes between 2000 and 3999) as provided in the
Compustat annual research file for the 1971–2010 period. All variables are deflated to 1982 dollars using
the CPI. Only firms with at least 24 consecutive months of data remain in the sample. Furthermore, we
winsorize the sample with regard to the book-to-market ratio, market equity, age, investment, asset sale, and
stock returns at the 99% and 1% level. In addition, we exclude firms that have a q below zero or above ten
to address issues of investment opportunity measurement in the data. We also require firms to hold at least
5 million dollars in fixed assets to eliminate very small firms. The final sample contains of 3,022 firms.
We consider the following firm individual variables: Ft are the net fixed assets (PPENT) at the beginning
of the period t, and Total Assets are the book values of the assets (AT). Asset Sale is equal to the cash
proceeds received from the sale of fixed assets (SPPE), and Investment is obtained from the Compustat
item capital expenditures (CAPX). Both variables are scaled by Ft . We compute the firm individual sales
growth as first difference of the Compustat item SALE. We standardize the firm individual sales growth
by subtracting the mean and scaling it with its standard deviation. To compute the sample aggregate sales
growth we compute then for each year the value-weighted mean sales growth across all sample firms. Age
is the number of years a firm has been listed at the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ, i.e., the current year minus the
first year of a firm’s stock price entry in the merged CRSP/Compustat file. Using Total Assets and Age, we
construct the SA-index as measure of financial constraints following Hadlock and Pierce (2010) as:
−0.737∗Total Assets+0.043∗ (Total Assets)2−0.04∗Age. (B.1)
Since the SA-index is a combination of total assets, squared total assets and age, its values are substantially
higher than our dependent variable in the regression analysis, i.e., asset sales, which is a variable that is
scaled with Ft . Therefore, we scale the SA-index by 10× 107. q is a proxy for growth opportunities
and calculated as the sum of total debt and market equity divided by the book value of total assets (cf.,
Hovakimian and Titman 2006). Financial Slack corresponds to the sum of cash and short-term investments
(CHE) scaled by Ft . We define Total Debt as the sum of total liabilities (LT) and total preferred stock
(PSTK) excluding deferred taxes (TXDB) and convertible debt (DCVT) scaled by Total Assets. As a proxy
for Cash Flow we use the sum of income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization (IB
+ DP) scaled by Ft . Cov. Ratio is EBITDA divided by interest expenses (XINT). We adopt an iterative
procedure to calculate Asset Volatility, following the steps in Vassalou and Xing (2004). In particular,
we estimate the volatility of equity with daily equity values over the past 12 month for each firm-year
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observation. This volatility serves as a starting guess for the estimation of the asset volatility. Applying the
Black-Scholes formula, we then compute daily asset values over the past 12 month using the daily equity
values, total liabilities, the starting guess for the asset volatility, and the risk free interest rate from CRSP.
Next, the standard deviation of those asset values can be calculated. This standard deviation is used as
the volatility of assets for the next iteration. We repeat this procedure until the asset volatilities from two
consecutive iterations converge to a tolerance level of 10E−4. The Altman (1968) Z-score is a widely used
measure of financial distress. It is computed for each firm as:
Z = 1.2∗ ACT −LCT
AT
+1.4∗ RE
AT
+3.3∗ NI+XINT +T XT
AT
+0.6∗ME
LT
+0.999∗ SALE
AT
. (B.2)
A higher value >2.99 indicates that the firm is not financially distressed. We compute the equity issuance
costs for our sample firms according to the cost function estimated in Hennessy and Whited (2007). In their
paper, Hennessy and Whited (2007) provide estimates for the equity issuance cost function for small, large
and all firms in their sample. At the end of each year, we sort firms according to their size (ME) into tercile
portfolios. (Using the SA-index instead of size as sorting variable does not change the quality of our results.)
We then compute the equity issuance cost for the firms in each portfolio for the subsequent year according
to the amount of equity that a firm issues in the corresponding year (SSTK). For the firms in the lowest size
portfolio, we use the estimation results of Hennessy and Whited (2007) for small firms, for the highest size
tercile the estimations for large firms, and for the medium size tercile the estimation results that Hennessy
and Whited (2007) obtain for the full sample. We winsorize the estimated equity issuance costs at the 90%
level to control for outliers.
In Table B1, we report some basic sample characteristics. The table reports the mean, the standard devi-
ation (Std), the median, the 25 percent (Q25) and the 75 percent quantiles (Q75). Panel A provides summary
statistics for different sample variables of the full sample. In Panel B and Panel C, the table reports the same
summary statistics but for bad and good states, respectively. We define an aggregate downturn of our firm
economy as years in which the sample aggregate sales growth and the annual return across sample firms are
in the bottom 25% across all years. We choose this definition of a business cycle downturn mainly because
sales growth combined with market based downturn measures are a direct measure of the propagation of pos-
itive and negative shocks from the aggregate economy onto the corporate level (see also the downturn defini-
tions in e.g. Opler and Titman 1994, Gilson, John, and Lang 1990). All other years are defined as good state.
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Table B1
Compustat Sample Summary Statistics
The table provides summary statistics for different sample variables in Panel A. In Panel B and Panel C, the table reports summary
statistics for bad (Panel B) and good (Panel C) states. We define an aggregate downturn of our firm economy as years in which the
sample aggregate sales growth and the average annual equity return across sample firms are, simultaneously, in the bottom 25% of
all years. All other years are considered as a good state. The table reports the mean, the standard deviation (Std), the median, the
25 percent (Q25), and the 75 percent quantile (Q75). Total Assets (AT ) and Fixed Assets (F) are in million dollars, measured at
the beginning of each year. q is the sum of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity divided by the book value
of total assets. Investment is equal to capital expenditures. Asset Sale are the cash proceeds from sale of fixed capital. Cash Flow
is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization. Fin. Slack is the sum of cash and short-term
investments. Investment, Asset Sale, Cash Flow, and Fin. Slack are scaled by the book value of the beginning-of-period net fixed
assets. Asset Volatility is the estimated volatility of a firms’ assets. Total debt is (LT+PSTK-TXDB-DCVT). Market Equity is
computed as the CRSP monthly share price (PRC) multiplied with the number of outstanding shares (SHROUT). The variable
Cov. Ratio is computed by dividing EBIT DA with the interest expenses. The sample period is 1971 to 2010. The sample consists
of 3,022 U.S. manufacturing firms.
Panel A: Summary Statistics – Full Sample Period
Variable Mean Std
Total Assets (TA) 1140.98 3857.31
Fixed Assets (F) 347.59 1135.2331
q 1.3397 1.4996
Investment/F 0.2104 0.1145
Asset Sales/F 0.0169 0.0347
Cash Flow/F 0.3413 0.7816
Fin. Slack/F 0.7583 1.6365
Asset Volatility 0.3951 0.5606
Total Debt/TA 0.4384 0.1798
Market Equity 1162.1369 3292.8338
Cov. Ratio 54.6242 735.2741
Panel B: Summary Statistics – Bad Business Cycle States
Variable Mean Std
Total Assets (TA) 968.2125 2496.1238
Fixed Assets (F) 310.3733 730.6911
q 0.881 1.4479
Investment/F 0.2226 0.1175
Asset Sales/F 0.0171 0.04
Cash Flow/F 0.366 0.6669
Fin. Slack/F 0.4752 1.2302
Asset Volatility 0.5313 0.8914
Total Debt/TA 0.4654 0.1669
Market Equity 602.085 2514.0054
Cov. Ratio 27.9017 172.8118
Panel C: Summary Statistics – Good Business Cycle States
Variable Mean Std
Total Assets (TA) 1156.1355 3954.1097
Fixed Assets (F) 350.8547 1163.9899
q 1.38 1.4974
Investment/F 0.2194 0.1142
Asset Sales/F 0.0168 0.0392
Cash Flow/F 0.3391 0.7909
Fin. Slack/F 0.7832 1.6652
Asset Volatility 0.3831 0.5120
Total Debt/TA 0.436 0.1807
Market Equity 1194.6936 3325.6946
Cov. Ratio 57.0005 765.4944
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Figure 1. Optimal Investment Thresholds. This figure shows the earnings levels at which equityholders
optimally exercise the growth option for a range of initial leverage ratios. The lower and upper solid lines are
the optimal investment thresholds for a firm that finances the exercise cost of the option by issuing equity in
good states and bad states, respectively. The lower and upper dashed lines are the corresponding investment
thresholds for a firm that finances the exercise cost of the option by selling assets.
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Figure 2. Financing Asset Sales and Firm Value. This figure illustrates the impact of financing asset
sales on the value of firms for three initial leverage ratios. The solid line shows the relationship between
the increase in the value of a firm from admitting financing asset sales and the scale parameter sG for high
leverage firms. High leverage firms have an initial leverage ratio of 0.75. Leverage is defined as debt value
divided by the value of the firm. The dashed and dotted lines plot the relationship for medium leverage firms
with an initial leverage of 0.5 and for low leverage firms with an initial leverage of 0.35, respectively.
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Figure 3. Leverage at Investment. This figure shows the leverage ratios upon investment of a firm that
selects initially an optimal leverage ratio and optimally finances the exercise cost of the option in good states
(solid line) and bad states (dashed line) as a function of equity issuance costs.
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Figure 4. Leverage at Investment and Cyclicality of the Growth Option. This figure shows the leverage
ratios upon investment of a firm that selects initially an optimal leverage ratio and optimally finances the
exercise cost of the option in good states (solid line) and bad states (dashed line) as a function of equity is-
suance costs. The dashed and the dashed-dotted lines are the corresponding leverage ratios upon investment
of a firm with a more cyclical growth option than the baseline firm.
0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09
0.18
0.19
0.2
0.21
0.22
0.23
0.24
0.25
0.26
0.27
Equity Issuance Costs
Le
ve
ra
ge
 a
t I
nv
es
tm
en
t
 
 
Leverage at Option Exercise in Good States (More Cyclical Option)
Leverage at Option Exercise in Good States (Baseline)
Leverage at Option Exercise in Bad States (More Cyclical Option)
Leverage at Option Exercise in Bad States (Baseline)
55
Figure 5. Optimal Financing Choice. This figure depicts equityholders’ optimal financing choice. In the
region to the right of the dashed line, they select asset sales in good states and bad states to finance the
exercise cost of the option. In the region to the left of the solid line, they issue equity in good states and bad
states. Between the dashed and the solid lines, equityholders issue equity in good states, and sell assets in
bad states to finance the exercise cost.
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Figure 6. Aggregate Equity Financing. This figure plots the aggregate quarterly ratio of firms in a typical
simulated economy that issue equity over time. The shaded regions are bad states, and the white regions
are good states.
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Figure 7. Aggregate Investment. This figure plots the aggregate quarterly ratio of firms in a typical
simulated economy that invest over time. The shaded regions are bad states, and the white regions are good
states.
Figure 8. Aggregate Default. This figure plots the aggregate quarterly ratio of firms in a typical simulated
economy that default over time. The shaded regions are bad states, and the white regions are good states.
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Figure 9. Aggregate Financing Asset Sales. This figure plots the aggregate quarterly ratio of firms in
a typical simulated economy that sell assets over time. The shaded regions are bad states, and the white
regions are good states.
Figure 10. Aggregate Investment and Financing Asset Sales. This figure plots the aggregate quarterly
ratio of firms in a typical simulated economy that invest (solid line), and the aggregate ratio of firms that sell
assets (dashed line) over time. The shaded regions are bad states, and the white regions are good states.
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Table 1
Compustat Sample Asset Sale Determinants
The table reports regression coefficients for linear regressions with industry fixed effects and industry clustered autocorrelation robust t-statistics
(in parentheses) with Asset Sale as dependent variable. Asset Sale are the cash proceeds from the sale of fixed capital. Investment is equal to
capital expenditures. Cash f low is the first lag of the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization. q is the first
lag of the sum of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. Financial Slack is the first
lag of the sum of cash and short-term investments. Investment, Cash Flow, Asset Sale, and Financial Slack are scaled by the book value of the
beginning-of-period net fixed assets. The variable Cov. Ratio is the first lag of the ratio of EBIT DA divided by the interest expenses. Asset Volatility
is the estimated volatility of a firms’ assets. Leverage is the first lag of (LT+PSTK-TXDB-DCVT) scaled by Total Assets. Bad State is a dummy
that is one if the aggregate sales growth and the average annual equity return across all firms in the sample are, simultaneously, in the bottom 25%
of all years. Corr(q,Salesgr.) is the firm individual 5-year rolling correlation of the firm’s q with the aggregate annual sales growth across all firms.
SA-Index is the financial constraints measure of Hadlock and Pierce (2010). ILow Z is a dummy that is one if a firm has a Z-Score (see Equation
(B.2)) value below 3. The sample period is 1971 to 2010. N is the number of observations in the corresponding regression. The full sample consists
of an unbalanced sample of 3,022 U.S. manufacturing firms.
Dependent variable: Asset sale (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Investment 0.024 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.023 0.005 0.023 0.007
(5.20) (0.57) (0.44) (0.34) (5.17) (0.60) (4.93) (1.01)
Cash Flow -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-7.16) (-7.48) (-7.45) (-7.01) (-7.18) (-7.47) (-6.76) (-6.85)
q -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(-14.59) (-13.26) (-13.46) (-11.86) (-14.59) (-13.2) (-13.95) (-12.49)
Financial Slack -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-2.71) (-1.12) (-1.10) (0.97) (-2.81) (-1.21) (-3.19) (-1.96)
Cov. Ratio -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.40) (-1.29) (-1.28) (-0.51) (-1.41) (-1.30) (-4.52) (-5.16)
Asset Volatility -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-3.02) (-3.07) (-2.82) (-3.86) (-3.00) (-3.06) (-3.07) (-3.10)
Leverage 0.012 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.003
(2.89) (0.73) (0.77) (0.40) (2.84) (0.75) (2.98) (0.56)
Lever. x Invest. 0.044 0.044 0.052 0.043 0.040
(2.42) (2.38) (2.58) (2.40) (2.59)
Bad State x Invest. 0.019 0.016
(3.23) (1.98)
Bad State -0.006 -0.005
(-5.15) (-3.65)
Corr(q,Salesgr.) 0.001
(1.41)
Invest. x Corr(q,Salesgr.) -0.001
(-0.25)
Bad State x Corr(q,Salesgr.) 0.005
(2.25)
Invest. x Bad State x Corr(q,Salesgr.) -0.024
(-2.34)
SA-Index 0.007 0.003
(6.33) (0.43)
Invest. x SA-Index 0.013
(0.48)
ILow Z 0.000 0.000
(2.39) (2.04)
Invest. x ILow Z 0.007 -0.002
(1.21) (-0.22)
Lever. x ILow Z 0.003
(0.94)
Invest. x Lever. x ILow Z 0.007
(0.26)
Industry-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.034
No. of Obs. 17468 17468 17468 14514 17468 17468 17257 17257
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Table 2
Baseline parameter choice
This table summarizes our baseline parameter choice. Panel A lists the annualized parameters of a typical Compustat firm. Panels
B and C report our parameter choice for the expansion option and the macroeconomy, respectively.
Parameter Parameter value
Panel A: Firm Characteristics Good State (G) Bad State (B)
Initial earnings level (X) 10 10
Tax advantage of debt (τ) 0.15 0.15
Earnings growth rate (µi) 0.0782 -0.0401
Systematic earnings volatility (σX ,Ci ) 0.0834 0.1334
Idiosyncratic earnings volatility (σX ,id) 0.168 0.168
Equity issuance cost (ϒi) 0.08 0.1
Asset Liquidity (Λ1) 0.9259 0.9091
Recovery rate (αi) 0.63 0.57
Panel B: Expansion Option Parameters of a Typical Firm
Exercise price (Ki) 183.13 160
Scale parameter (si) 1.0925 1.03
Panel C: Economy
Rate of leaving regime i (λi) 0.2718 0.4928
Consumption growth rate (θi) 0.0420 0.0141
Consumption growth volatility (σCi ) 0.0094 0.0114
Rate of time preference (ρ) 0.015 0.015
Relative risk aversion (γ) 10 10
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution (Ψ) 1.5 1.5
Table 3
Simulated Sample Results
The table provides summary statistics for the simulated matched samples over the full sample period, bad states, and good states.
The sample period is 50 years with simulated quarterly observations. Each simulated sample consists of 1352 firms that are
matched to our Compustat sample. Firms are replaced in case of investment or default. We report the mean of the mean values
of 100 simulated samples, and the standard deviation (Std) of the mean across simulations. Total Assets (TA) is the total value of
firm assets. Investment, Asset Sale, and Equity Finance are the annualized percentage number of firms that invest, sell assets, or
issue equity, respectively. The q of model firms is obtained by dividing the value of the firm by the value of its invested assets. The
variable Cov. Ratio corresponds to firm earnings divided by coupon payments. Leverage is the market value of debt divided by the
market value of the firm. Equity Value/TA is the market value of equity scaled by total the total firm value.
All States Bad State Good State
Variable Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Total Assets (TA) 194.52 12.98 161.37 9.37 215.33 9.46
Investment 0.081 0.009 0.059 0.007 0.095 0.01
Asset Sales 0.034 0.012 0.031 0.01 0.036 0.014
Equity Finance 0.047 0.013 0.028 0.01 0.059 0.015
q 1.45 0.024 1.38 0.018 1.50 0.018
Cov. Ratio 1.83 0.164 1.75 0.146 1.88 0.171
Leverage 0.43 0.027 0.48 0.025 0.39 0.022
Equity Value/TA 0.576 0.027 0.518 0.025 0.612 0.023
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Table 4
Conditional Asset Sale Ratios
The table provides summary statistics for conditional asset sale ratios from the simulated samples. Asset sale and investment are
both dummy variables that are equal to one in case of an asset sale or an investment, respectively. To calculate conditional asset
sale ratios, we aggregate over all simulations the asset sale and investment observations for the sample that we consider, and divide
the sum of asset sale observations by the sum of investment observations. We compute this ratio for all firms, for firms in the
highest and the lowest leverage terciles with resorting in every period, during bad and good states, and for firms with a more (H)
or less (L) cyclical growth option. For details on the simulation see Section 6. Lbad and Lgood are asset sale ratios of firms with a
low cyclicality of the expansion option during bad and good states, respectively. Hbad and Hgood indicate the ratios for firms with
a high cyclicality in the two states.
Asset Sale Conditional on Investment
Total Asset Sales 42.13%
High Leverage Firms 64.31%
Low Leverage Firms 34.69%
Bad States 53.72%
Good States 38.25%
Lbad 48.75%
Lgood 41.22%
Hbad 46.12%
Hgood 41.79%
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